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CONTINUITY AND CONTRADICTION IN THE
THEORY AND DISCOURSE
OF DEPENDENCE
Brigid Kennedy-Pfister*
INTRODUCTION
Since the seventeenth century, the terms "dependence" and "in-
dependence" have been used as status markers in social and politi-
cal discourse in the United States. This discourse has colored both
historical and modern theory and philosophy of citizenship, race,
gender, family, work, welfare, and the role of government. As va-
rious groups and individuals have pursued particular political goals,
they have used and defined those terms in diverse ways and at-
tached different meanings and connotations to them. The category
of "dependent" in particular has been transformed from a term
that at one time marked a natural condition in which certain
groups existed, to a term that today defines a social problem. This
article describes the content of, and reasons for, this transforma-
tion. My examination attempts to "bring into the open some impli-
cations of our language and actions regarding [dependency] about
which officials and interest groups are usually silent, a silence or
obliviousness that also buttresses preferred ideologies."'
The discourse and philosophy of dependency show that the
terms "dependent" and "independent" have meant many things
both in legal and political rhetoric and within individual relation-
ships. Their meanings are mutable and informed by social, theoret-
* Staff Attorney at the Children's Law Center of Massachusetts. B.F.A., Boston
University, 1990; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, 1997; LL.M., Harvard
Law School, 1999. The author has also served as an Adjunct Lecturer in Law for the
Poverty Law and Practice Clinic at the Northeastern University School of Law.
Thanks especially to Cathleen K. Pfister for her meticulous editing of the first drafts
of this paper; to Professors Duncan Kennedy, Judith Olans Brown, James V. Rowan,
and the late Gary Bellow for their insightful comments and guidance; to my col-
leagues at the Children's Law Center for their constant encouragement of my profes-
sional endeavors; to my fellow card players for keeping laughter in my eyes; and to
Professor Karl E. Klare for his optimism and support without which my opportunities
and experiences certainly would have been less rich. Any errors or omissions are mine
alone.
1. MURRAY EDELMAN, CONSTRUCTING THE POLITICAL SPECTACLE 13 (1988).
My inquiry focuses on the social problem of dependence in particular, while Professor
Edelman's was an inquiry concerned with the construction of social problems in
general.
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ical, economic, and experiential forces. At the same time the terms
seem to connote both objective and subjective states of being.
Communities, social philosophers, commentators, politicians, me-
dia, and policy experts may categorize certain individuals or classes
as dependent, whereas, in their own consciousness, these suppos-
edly dependent individuals or classes may feel a great measure of
freedom. Similarly, individuals who are classified as independent
may feel constrained, oppressed, and without a sense of autonomy.
As with many terms used in political discourse, reality does not
match rhetoric. The terms dependent and independent are used
not to describe the reality of a set of relations, but, rather, to mark
certain individuals and groups as inferior.
In my examination of these terms, I concentrate upon depen-
dency discourse as it has been used in shaping welfare reform and
in the treatment of poor people in the United States. I also focus
on the historical transformation of various groups as they have
moved from being dependent to independent classes. After re-
viewing this discourse and history, I conclude that commentators
who use dependence as a status marker root their distinctions in
two theories that are fundamental to liberal American thought: in-
dividualism and social contract theory. In the context of welfare
programs, these theories are evident in policy determinations
about whether individuals are competent, productive, and morally
upstanding. Moreover, if an individual fails in one of these re-
spects, the discourse is concerned with both the cause of this failure
and the length of time the individual remains in this fallen state.
The ideal of individual independence and autonomy is, of course,
one of the central animating features of American political and le-
gal theory. Early republican theory during the American Revolu-
tion emphasized "independence for the citizen (as well as for the
former colonies) [as] a key term: it implied economic indepen-
dence (as opposed to vassalage) along with, and as the underpin-
ning for, freedom of judgment."'2 Some commentators even have
gone so far as to characterize the struggle between individual lib-
erty and state power as a "fundamental contradiction" in American
legal theory, and to describe this tension as embodied by the con-
tradictory beliefs that "the goal of individual freedom is at the
same time dependent on and incompatible with the communal co-
2. Nancy F. Cott, Giving Character to Our Whole Civil Polity: Marriage and the
Public Order in the Late Nineteenth Century, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY:
NEW FEMINIST ESSAYS 110-111 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995).
668
2001] THEORY AND DISCOURSE OF DEPENDENCE 669
ercive action, [or state power,] that is necessary to achieve it."3
The question is whether and how the individual can achieve sover-
eignty and full self-determination when she must submit to the au-
thority of the community. And, how can the individual achieve this
actualization without also relying upon the security of the state?
A second and connected central tenet guiding American political
and legal theory, is the idea that all members of civil society enter
into a social contract under which they not only obtain certain
rights and privileges, but also accept certain obligations. This idea
of a social covenant is not so much concerned with the extent of
state infringement on and protection of individual and market au-
tonomy; rather, it focuses upon the rights that people relinquish,
the privileges they obtain, and the obligations they must perform as
members of society. Thomas Hobbes described the need of indi-
viduals voluntarily to restrain themselves by the introduction of a
greater collective power, the "Common-wealth." Hobbes ex-
plained that:
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love
Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that
restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Com-
mon-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of
a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting them-
selves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is nec-
essarily consequent ... to the naturall Passions of men, when
there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by
feare of punishment to the performance of their covenants, and
observation of those Lawes of Nature.
The only way to erect such a Common Power... is, [for men] to
conferre all their power and strength upon one Man, or Assem-
bly of men, that may reduce all their Wills, by plurality of voices,
unto one Will[;] . .. and to submit their Wills, every one to his
Will, and their Judgments, to his Judgment. This is more than
Consent ... it is a reall Unitie of them all, in one and the same
Person, made by Covenant of every man with every man.4
John Locke set forth a similar concept, 5 and in the contemporary
American context, Lawrence Mead describes it thus:
3. Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF. L.
REV. 205, 211 (1979); Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical
Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 980 (1982).
4. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 93, 93-95 (Richard E. Flathman & David John-
ston eds., 1997) (original spelling retained).
5. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, chapter VIII, 52-65
(C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Pub. 1980) (1690).
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[E]quality to Americans tends not to mean middle-class income
or status at all, but rather the enjoyment of equal citizenship,
meaning the same rights and obligations as others. While we
usually think of citizenship as something political, specifying
rights like free speech and duties such as obedience to the law, it
has a social dimension too. Benefit programs define a set of
social rights for vulnerable groups, while Americans tend to re-
gard minimal competencies like work or getting through school
as obligatory even if they are not legally enforced. These social
obligations may not be governmental, but they are public in that
they fall within the collective expectation that structures an or-
derly society. Both political and social duties are included in
what I shall call the common obligations of citizenship.6
Questions about the content of these obligations and the sources
from which they are derived have become more complicated as the
United States has become a more pluralistic society. Normative
questions arise concerning the nature and content of government
regulation, including questions about the mutual expectations of
government and citizen; the sources from which the content of our
social obligations are derived; the level and consistency with which
social obligations are imposed upon a plural citizenry; the manner
and nature of enforcement of social duties; and the moral, eco-
nomic, or legal sanctions for failure to live up to these obligations.
The continuing cultural use of the terms "dependent" and "inde-
pendent" as rhetorical tools for social categorization is an attempt
to develop answers to some of these most complicated questions.
I. SOCIAL MEANINGS IN THE DISCOURSE OF DEPENDENCY
One contemporary dictionary definition of dependent is:
... 2 A: determined or conditioned by something else: CONTIN-
GENT. . . B: unable to exist, sustain oneself, or act suitably or
normally without the assistance or direction of another or others
c: connected in a subordinate relationship: subject to the
jurisdiction of another . .. D: lacking the necessary means of
support and receiving aid from others (as from persons outside
the immediate family or from a private or public welfare
agency).7
6. LAWRENCE M. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT: THE PROBLEM OF OBLIGATION
IN SOCIAL POLICY 12 (1986) (emphasis in original).
7. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 604 (3d ed. 1981).
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According to Black's Law Dictionary, as a legal term, dependent
also has multiple meanings. Generally, however, a dependent indi-
vidual is "[o]ne who derives his or her main support from another.
Means relying on, or subject to, someone else for support; not able
to exist or sustain oneself, or to perform anything without the will,
power or aid of someone else."8 Even without reference to the
discursive context in which this word is used, the different registers
of these definitions reveal the manner in which the term might be
used to construct relationships. The images invoked are about con-
tingency, insecurity, vulnerability, lack of self-governance, reliance,
subordination, and inferiority. Nothing in these definitions indi-
cates positive aspects of a dependent relationship; neither does the
term connote mutuality or inter-dependence among individuals.
Almost universally, societies understand that each member is, to
some extent, a dependent being in the sense that we rely upon peo-
ple and institutions for support. We depend upon our families and
friends for emotional support and assistance to care for our physi-
cal and economic needs, and upon individuals with particular skills,
such as doctors, mechanics, lawyers, or technicians, to help us iden-
tify and treat or solve problems. Moreover, we depend upon our
parents, siblings, teachers, religious leaders, mentors, and co-work-
ers for mutual sustenance, guidance, knowledge, values, and expe-
rience. Indeed, most of us find, as we seek a better life, that
depending on other human beings is beneficial, positive, and fulfil-
ling to our individual and social well being. Furthermore, most of
us benefit from returning the favor by allowing others to depend
on us. In short, dependency is "universal and inevitable in our in-
dividual lives and inherent in the human condition."9 Each individ-
ual has dependent, or interdependent, relationships with other
human beings, with social institutions, and with the state.
This positive interpersonal reliance and support, or interdepen-
dence, among individuals and entities is not, however, the central
focus of dependency discourse. Indeed, it rarely appears even in
the background. Rather, commentators and social philosophers
who strategically use dependency rhetoric as a means to achieving
their goals, focus on making judgments about both the abilities and
character of individuals and the proper place or status of these in-
dividuals in society. The judgments and rhetoric center on four
claims. Some social philosophers claim that dependent individuals
8. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 437 (6th ed. 1990).
9. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Nature of Dependencies and Welfare "Re-
form," 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 287, 292 (1996).
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are unable adequately to act in their own or society's best inter-
est;' these commentators focus on the dependent individual's ca-
pacity to act or to govern." Others assert that dependency is a
status defined by an individual's failure to conform to social and
moral norms because of a personal moral deficiency. 12 Still others
contend that dependent status is characterized by a coercive rela-
tionship with the state.' 3 Finally, some theorists define dependency
as an economic status tied to an individual's failure to participate in
the wage labor market, or as reliance upon others or the state for
sustenance.
14
Although I have recognized these strands within dependency dis-
course, these four concerns are neither all-inclusive nor static. Our
cultural use of dependence rhetoric is complex, with different
strands more or less prominent at any given time. In addition, the-
orists who are preoccupied with a given class of dependent persons
often employ more than one of these meanings and visions. The
lines between these meanings are further blurred because even at
the same time, more than one conception may be invoked.
A. Dependence and Capacity
Early English usage of the term "dependent" arose in the con-
text of defining social relations between and among individuals in
pre-industrial England and America.' 5 This usage was so common
that it was uncontroversial, and denoted a normal state of subordi-
nation. That state of subordination did not incorporate concomi-
tant moral stigma, although it did connote status inferiority.16
Social use of the term dependency in this early period encom-
passed aspects of both governance and self-governance. Depen-
dent individuals did not have the social or political competence or
10. LOCKE, supra note 5 (identifying children, the mentally ill, and the mentally
retarded as individuals without sufficient capacity); MEAD, supra note 6 (stating that
in earlier centuries, women, slaves, and indentured servants were also among the
groups that society customarily believed were treated as incapable of self-govern-
ance); see infra note 17 and accompanying text.
11. LOCKE, supra note 5; MEAD, supra note 6.
12. CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-
1980, at 29 (1984); Raymond A. Mohl, The Abolition of Public Outdoor Relief, 1870-
1900, in SOCIAL WELFARE OR SOCIAL CONTROL? SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS
ON REGULATING THE POOR 35, 39 (Walter I. Trattner ed., 1983).
13. Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
14. MEAD, supra note 6; infra, Section III.B.
15. Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a
Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 312 (1994).
16. Id. at 313.
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capacity to act in the best interest of themselves, their families, or
society. Dependents were men, women, and children for whom it
was better to be ruled by others than ruled by themselves. 17 Inde-
pendent individuals, by comparison, were masters both of their
own destinies and the destinies of others, their dependents. They
were full members of the polity, trusted to act appropriately and in
the best interest of all. These individuals controlled their bodies,
actions, relationships, and property free from the interference by
others. They spoke for themselves and their dependents in both
the community and the political process. They exercised dominion
over themselves and were "fre[e] from dependence on the wills of
others."' 8
In modern times, the status relations between children and par-
ents, the mentally ill or seriously infirm and their guardians, and, to
a more limited extent, prisoners and their wardens, are what re-
main of this system. 9 The ability of each of these groups to exer-
cise the full social and political capacity that inheres to the average
citizen is legally restricted. In these cases, the law appoints some-
one who does have full capacity, or independence of will, to act for
the dependent. To a greater or lesser extent, depending upon the
specific category, a separate individual or entity, whether a parent,
guardian, next friend, hospital, or agency, has control over and re-
sponsibility for the actions, will, and person of the dependent. In
addition, the law may bestow the guardian either with benefits to
encourage undertaking the relationship, °2 or wide latitude in exer-
cising control.2 '
17. See ROBERT J. STEINFELD, THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOY-
MENT RELATION IN ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE, 1350-1870, at 56
(1991) (defining the dependent members of a household).
18. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM:
HOBBES TO LOCKE 3 (1962).
19. I include prisoners in this category because they are denied full citizenship
rights. But, unlike other groups so categorized, the cause of their dependence is a
"voluntary" one; they "voluntarily" have forfeited their rights of control because of
their actions or judgment. Thus, they might more properly be a worry for commenta-
tors who are concerned about individual morality and behavior as a marker of depen-
dency. As I have said, however, these categories often overlap and work together to
construct social relations.
20. Such benefits might include incentives such as tax relief for individuals caring
for dependents, or allocation of a higher level of funds for schools that enroll disabled
children.
21. Parents have wide, although not unlimited, latitude and there is little oversight
in their care and control of the children. E.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923) (holding a parent's right to conceive and rear her children essential under the
Fourteenth Amendment); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (affirming
Meyer); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (upholding exemption for Amish
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Today, the number of classes of people that are dependent in this
way, and the extent of control the guardian may exercise, is more
limited than it has been historically. At various times the law has
defined the status of slaves, free blacks, workers, women, and pau-
pers as such dependents.22 Indeed, until relatively recently, in both
England and the United States, only male, white land-owners, were
full legal, social, and political citizens. 23 Certainly, prior to the pas-
sage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Ninteenth
Amendments, the disabilities of dependence, as they do today, in-
cluded not only a transfer of control over and responsibility for the
actions, will, and person of the dependent, but also a denial of the
right to vote and participate in self-governance.
This status of dependence was a normal, as opposed to a devi-
ant, condition, a social relation, as opposed to an individual
trait. Thus it did not carry any moral opprobrium.
Nevertheless, dependency did mean status inferiority and legal
coverture, being a part of a unit headed by someone else who
families from compulsory education statute, and stating that a family has privacy in-
terest in rearing and educating children); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 447
(1990) (upholding statute requiring parental notification of abortion and forty-eight
hour delay and stating "a natural parent who has demonstrated sufficient commit-
ment to his or her children is thereafter entitled to raise the children free from undue
state interference").
Similarly, because of concerns about safety and control, prison administrators re-
tain wide discretion in operating their institutions and controlling the conduct of the
inmates in their charge. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
22. Slaves and free blacks were controlled both by legal and extra-legal means at
work and in decisions about their family lives. Both of these groups were explicitly
excluded from the political process. For centuries, certain classes of laborers and ser-
vants were subject to compulsory work requirements on pains of imprisonment and
were considered inadequate to the task of self governance. In addition, during the
impetus for minimum wage and maximum hour laws, the Supreme Court approved a
state law restricting the hours that underground miners could work. Holden v. Hardy,
169 U.S. 366 (1898). The Court allowed such restrictions on the acknowledged liberty
of miners to sell their labor under the philosophy of "freedom of contract" at least in
part because of the workers' dependence. Id. As the Court later described its holding
in Holden, "the kind of employment... and the character of the employds in such kind
of labor, were such as to make it reasonable and proper for the state to interfere to
prevent the employ6s from being constrained by the rules laid down by the proprie-
tors in regard to labor." Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54 (1905) (emphasis ad-
ded). Women were also long held to be subject to the domination of their husbands,
or if unmarried, simply did not enjoy the same rights and privileges as men to contract
for themselves, control their property, or vote. Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
23. Laura F. Edwards, The Marriage as Covenant is at the Foundation of All Our
Rights: The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina After Emancipation, 14 LAW
& HIST. REV. 81, 83 (1996); Nancy F. Cott, Marriage and Women's Citizenship in the
United States, 1830-1934, AM. HIST. REV. 1440, 1451 n.32 and accompanying text
(Dec. 1998).
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had legal standing. In a world of status hierarchies dominated
by great landowners and their retainers, all members of a house-
hold other than its "head" were dependents, as were free or
servile peasants on an estate. They were ... caught up, so to
speak, "subsumed"... into the personalities of their fathers and
masters. 24
Marriage was one of the most prevalent customary and legal re-
lationships of dependency, and when a propertied man entered
into that covenant, his marital status and property owner status
combined to form evidence of his suitability for civic participation.
The institution of marriage required the wife to serve and obey
her husband-to become his dependent-as he was to support
and protect his wife. Participatory citizenship in the American
political tradition required the opposite, however: independence
.... [R]evolutionary spokesmen had highlighted personal inde-
pendence as necessary to public virtue and political rights. Inde-
pendence meant freedom of judgment-freedom from the
imposition of the will of another-and in the eighteenth century
that meant heading a household and owning property of one's
own so as not to have to look to anyone else for a job, credit, or
support.25
These dependent status relations benefited both parties to the
relationship and society. For example, children simply could not
survive physically without depending on adults. Within the depen-
dent, parent-child relationship, each generation was nourished and
taught socially acceptable behaviors and survival mechanisms.
New generations of workers were bred, the benefit of whose labor
accrued to the household, at least for some period of time. Simi-
larly, women's historically dependent status was beneficial both to
woman and society. Women had a claim to the support and protec-
tion of their husbands and fathers as much as the men had a claim
to the women's labor and reproduction. In addition, society and
government benefited from these dependent household relations
as they formed and reproduced the central organizing unit of
society.
The basic social unit to which everyone belonged was a family.
Women in particular were "understood either [as] married or to
bee (sic) married" according to a 1632 English treatise regarding
24. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 15, at 313 (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). In the case of prisoners, of course, moral opprobrium does attach.
25. Cott, supra note 23, at 1451.
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the legal status of women.26 Moreover, because marriage was the
means of creating legitimate blood lineage, it "necessarily preceded
the relationship between a father and his sons, which many theo-
rists interpreted as the foundation of all political authority."27 John
Locke, for example, explained that "[tihe first society was between
man and wife which gave beginning to that between parents and
children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came
to be added. '2 8 Furthermore, this first society was "made by a vol-
untary compact between man and woman."2 9 That compact was
marriage, the ultimate end of which was "procreation, and the mu-
tual support and assistance,"3 as might be necessary to maintain
their affection and the nourishment and maintenance of their chil-
dren.31 Even two hundred years later this concept of family gov-
ernance continued to be an explicit basis for legal decision-making.
As one court noted, "the marriage relation, as old as the human
race, [is] the basis of the family, which is itself the basis of society
and civil states. 32
In contrast to the "status inferiority and legal coverture" that
attached to the dependent person, 33 the ideal of individual inde-
pendence and autonomy was assigned to the master of the house-
hold. This concept of independence developed into a central
feature of Colonial American political and legal theory. 34 For ex-
ample, John Locke's Second Treatise of Government, first pub-
lished in 1690, a document that was especially influential in
America as a source of the doctrines of limited government and the
right of the people to overthrow the government, 35 was, fundamen-
tally, a theory animated by an ideal of individual autonomy.36 In
26. MARY BETH NORTON, FOUNDING MOTHERS AND FATHERS: GENDERED
POWER AND THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 57 (1996) (quoting an anonymous
lawyer in 1632).
27. Id.
28. LOCKE, supra note 5, at Chapter VII, § 77.
29. Id. § 78.
30. Id. § 83.
31. Id. §§ 80, 83.
32. Ritter v. Ritter, 31 Pa. 396, 398 (1858) (holding that a married woman could not
sue her husband to collect a debt on a contract made between them during marriage).
33. Fraser & Gordon, supra note 15, at 313.
34. LOCKE, supra note 5, at xxi. In his introduction, the editor describes Locke's
theory as beginning "with free and equal individuals none of whom have any claim to
jurisdiction over others." Id. That autonomy, along with individual rationality and
consent, form the basis of the theory. Id. See generally MACPHERSON, supra note 18,
at 3.
35. LOCKE, supra note 5, at vii.
36. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 255-57.
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American legal thought, this independent ideal was elaborated in
Adam Smith's theory of the capitalist political economy, and in the
notions of legal rights and duties.37
These concepts created areas of protection and exclusion
through which individuals could enforce and maintain a zone free
from the interference of others. The concepts also popularized the
notion that ideal interactions between individuals, as far as possi-
ble, should be unmediated or unregulated by the state. The role of
the state was only to preserve an individual's ability to act and bar-
gain freely without interference from others. Individualism thus
included an ideal of self-sufficiency and independence that "meant
invulnerability to the wants and needs of others and not having to
depend on their good will or solidarity. '3 The independent being
was an autonomous, freely-bargaining individual who relied upon
the security of the state not only to recognize these bargains as a
product of free will but also to enforce them.
This individualist theory also had a "possessive quality, '39 in the
sense that the individual was the proprietor of his person, capacity,
and will, and owed nothing to the community for that ownership.4 °
From that individual proprietorship also sprang the existence, pro-
tection, and perpetuation of the institution of private property.
According to the theory, every man held "unquestionable prop-
erty" over his own person and capacities and over "the Labour of
his body and the Work of his Hands .... ",41 Locke asserted that
the act of mixing a man's labor with products of the natural world
was the act of making private property.42 The essence of freedom,
the individual's dominion or proprietorship over his body, ener-
gies, and thoughts, was therefore "freedom from dependence on
the wills of others, and [that] freedom [was] a function of
possession. '4
3
37. Singer, supra note 3, at 986.
38. William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution In the Welfare System, 38 STAN.
L. REV. 1431, 1433 (1986).
39. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 3.
40. Id.
41. LOCKE, supra note 5, at § 27.
42. Id.
43. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 3. It goes without saying that slaves could
never be independent in this sense despite the fact that they certainly worked be-
cause, as a matter of law, custom, and theory, they had no dominion over their own
bodies or energies. Slaves simply did not govern themselves; they were governed by
their masters. For example, it was impossible for male slaves to maintain parallel
claims to those held by free-men for payment for the labor of their wives and off-
spring. Margaret A. Burnham, An Impossible Marriage: Slave Law and Family Law, 5
LAW & INEQ. 187, 216 (1987). "The slave husband ...had no marital ownership
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In the Lockean view, independence was defined by an individ-
ual's power: the recognized ability of an individual to choose the
relationships into which he entered, the extent of an individual's
control over actions taken within those relationships, and the free-
dom from interference due to regulation of those actions that an
individual enjoyed. The difference between dependence and inde-
pendence rested in the individual's capacity. For example, Locke
explained that children, although they were born to such freedom,
were not born into it.44 Rather, a child was not free until the he
attained:
[The] maturity wherein he might be supposed capable to know
[the] law [of nature], that so he might keep his actions within the
bounds of it. When he has acquired that state, he is presumed to
know how far that law is to be his guide, and how far he may
make use of his freedom, and so comes to have it; till then, some
body else must guide him, who is presumed to know how far the
law allows a liberty .... [What makes a man free] to have the
liberty to dispose of his actions and possessions according to his
own will, within the permission of [the] law? A capacity to
know that law; which is supposed by that law .... If this made
the father free, it shall make the son free too. Till then we see
the law allows the son to have no will, but he is to be guided by
the will of his father or guardian who is to understand for him.
[Further,] if, through defects that may happen out of the ordi-
nary course of nature, any one comes not to such a degree of
reason, wherein he might be supposed capable of knowing the
law and so living within the rules of it, he is never capable of
being a free man, he is never let loose to the disposure of his
own will (because he knows no bounds to it, has not understand-
ing, its proper guide) but is continued under the tuition and gov-
ernment of others .. .
From this individualist theory it followed that independence was
reserved for those individuals who had the specific capacity to un-
derstand the law and exercise reason in managing their thoughts,
actions, and property.
interest in his wife, and therefore he had no ownership interest in his children. This
effected a double diminution of the slave father's legal and social status: he could not
claim ownership of his children, as could free men, nor could he, through his progeny,
enrich his master, as could slave women. He had only his own labor to 'give' his
master, not that of his wife or his children." Id.
44. LOCKE, supra note 5, at § 55.
45. Id. §§ 59, 60 (emphasis in original).
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The outcome of this idea of dependence was a hierarchy in which
only one group was allowed to rule.46
[Others] lived as dependents within the private sphere, sheltered
from the public gaze. Subject to the governance of a household
head, they could not claim the requisite civil and political rights
that would allow them to move freely in the space outside the
household's borders .... The figure of a household head was an
adult, white, propertied male. To those who held the reins of
power, such men were the only people capable of the responsi-
bilities of governance, whether private or public. Because wo-
men, children, and African Americans were considered to lack
both self-control and the capacity for reason, they required the
protection and guidance of a white man.4 7
Characteristically, the relationship operated only in one direc-
tion; there was no acknowledged interdependence or mutuality be-
tween the master and dependent. The benefits, both of production
and reproduction, that the independent man accrued from his
spouse, child, slave, servant, or laborer, did not in any way diminish
his independence. His reliance upon them for income, property, or
sustenance remained invisible, perhaps intentionally so, within the
discourse and definition.
Independence... for the male household head existed in coun-
terpoint to the dependence of others. Having and supporting
dependents was evidence of independence. Thus marriage as
well as property empowered a man in civic status, showing his
capacity for citizenship by making him head of a household ....
In corollary, marriage made women into dependents. There was
no middle ground here: either one was independent and had the
capacity to have dependents or one was dependent on someone
else. The coverture of married women in the Anglo-American
common law represented and perpetuated this polarity. In mak-
ing a woman a wife, marriage removed from her and transferred
to her husband her property and income, the very items that
indicated free will. The property cession both symbolized and
operationalized a husband's independence and his wife's (eco-
nomic) dependence and consequent civic disability.48
46. It was not all white men who had sufficient capacity to be independent, it was
only those with property. See generally STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 56.
47. Laura F. Edwards, The Marriage Covenant is at the Foundation of All Our
Rights: The Politics of Slave Marriages in North Carolina after Emancipation, 14 LAW
& HIST. REV. 81, 83 (1996).
48. Cott, supra note 25, at 1452.
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B. Dependence and Morality
The uses of "dependent" and "independent" that I described
thus far do not fall overtly within moral or behavioral dimensions.
Distinctions are based upon apparently natural occurrences such as
youth, gender, or property distribution.49 The normative questions
of who has or should have capacity to act independently do, how-
ever, contain a moral element. I now turn to the historical and
continuing rhetorical uses of dependency that define people by
how strictly they conform their behavior to prevailing norms. So-
cial philosophers who use the term dependence to denote an indi-
vidual or group moral defect, specifically distinguish from this
definition specific groups of people who are dependent because of
a "defect[ ] that may happen out of the ordinary course of na-
ture."5 Instead, these theorists classify dependents as individuals
who have been complicit in the making of their status; dependent
individuals have identifiable moral or behavioral shortcomings,
and these deficiencies result in their subordination. The existence
of these defects justifies a policy judgment about the desirability of
allowing these individuals to control their own lives.
The common modern use of the term "drug dependent" is an
example of this application of dependent. Although drug and alco-
hol abuse in contemporary society is treated as an illness, moral
connotations are still attached to the term; drug addicts are still
considered to contribute to their own failings by taking the first
puff of marijuana. But this category of dependents includes all in-
dividuals who could in some way be held responsible for their own
subjugated state. Such individuals might include slaves, indentured
servants, prisoners, and the poor. These are groups that histori-
cally have existed both at the bottom of the social scale, and under
the physical domination and whim of others. These individuals are
weak and subject to the immoral influences of other people, of
chemicals, or of a set of values, desires, or psychological forces.
For any of these reasons, the dependent in some sense appears to
be acting irrationally, or without the requisite measure of appropri-
ate social control. The individual has ignored social norms that
bind society, and, therefore, deserves sanction. The individual's
lack of moral temperance justifies intervention by the state
49. Unequal distribution of property, of course, is not in reality natural, nor is the
inferiority of gender or youth, but the use of "dependence" and "independence" as
status markers among these classes, is certainly naturalized by law, theory, and
custom.
50. LOCKE, supra note 5, at § 60.
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whether by punishment through incarceration, or imposition of
conditions regulating the individual's personal or family life.
When dependent is used in this way, the person so classified is
not necessarily stripped of her legal or political rights, although she
may be.51 Nor is she unable to care for herself because of a bodily
limitation on her capabilities or a physical restriction on her per-
son. Rather, because she is perceived to be unable to act in appro-
priate ways, the person is restricted, punished, or treated to correct
the offensive behavior. That the individual succumbed to weak-
ness or temptation is attributable to the fibre and fault of the per-
son and for this reason she is subject to the moral judgment of her
fellow citizens. This use of the category dependent looks to the
cause of the person's dependent state as a distinguishing feature.
In a certain respect, this use of dependent resembles claims
about an individual's lack of capacity and trustworthiness to govern
his or herself. Dependent individuals, in this second usage, albeit
for morally blameworthy reasons, are not trusted either to act in
their own best interests or in the interests of society. For example,
until the late eighteenth century, poor Englishmen and Americans
were subject to compulsory work requirements on penalty of im-
prisonment in order to limit their idleness and to improve their
51. Felons and/or prisoners in most states are stripped of their voting rights. E.g.,
ALA. CONST. OF 1901, art. VIII, § 182 (stating that "[nJo person convicted of a felony
involving moral turpitude, or who is mentally incompetent, shall be qualified to vote
until restoration of civil and political rights or removal of disability"); ALASKA
CONST., art. V., § 2 (stating that "[n]o person may vote who has been convicted of a
felony involving moral turpitude unless his civil rights have been restored. No person
may vote who has been judicially determined to be of unsound mind unless the disa-
bility has been removed"); ARK. CONST. OF 1874, art 3.; CAL. ELECTION CODE, § 2101
(West 1998) ("A person entitled to register to vote shall be a United States citizen, a
resident of California, not in prison or on parole for the conviction of a felony, and at
least eighteen years of age at the time of the next election."); COLO. CONST. OF 1876,
art. VII., § 10 (stating that "[n]o person while confined in any public prison shall be
entitled to vote; but every such person who was a qualified elector prior to such im-
prisonment, and who is released therefrom by virtue of a pardon, or by virtue of
having served out his full term of imprisonment, shall without further action, be in-
vested with all the rights of citizenship, except as otherwise provided in this constitu-
tion"); N.D. CONST. art. II, Elective Franchise, General Election, § 2 (stating that
"[n]o person who has been declared mentally incompetent by order of a court or
other authority having jurisdiction, which order has not been rescinded, shall be quali-
fied to vote. No person convicted of a felony shall be qualified to vote until his or her
civil rights are restored"). See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (up-
holding California's felony disenfranchisement statute).
In addition, while they are incarcerated, prisoners may be subject to strict control of
all their activities and after their release they may be subject to long term monitoring,
including restrictions on their freedom to travel, to freely associate, to vote, and to
live anonymously.
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character. Conditions in workhouses were deliberately intolerable
to discourage all but the most severely needy from seeking relief.52
These policies were rooted in the Puritan belief that "poverty [w]as
a mark of moral shortcoming,"53 or the result of "some personal
failing: intemperance, improvidence, indolence ... the greatest [of
which] by far was thought to be intemperance."54 These policies
also stemmed from a desire to control a wide variety of economic
and social causes of pauperism,55 and for social control of the la-
boring masses.5 6 This latter goal was paramount in times of high
unemployment, for in the face of a large number of unemployed
workers, social control is at its weakest. At times like this,
52. FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR:
THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 33-34 (2d ed. 1993). The authors note that
"[clonditions in the workhouse were intended to ensure that no one with any conceiv-
able alternatives would seek public aid." Id. at 33. Indeed, "workhouse conditions
were terrifying even in an age when life for the laboring classes was always brutal.
Conditions were such that a House of Commons investigation conducted in 1767
found that only seven of one-hundred infants born or received into workhouses had
survived for two years." Id. at 34, n.66.
53. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 226.
54. Miles F. Shore, Psychological Factors in Poverty, in THE NEW PATERNALISM
306 (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997).
55. Before the industrial age, the class named "the poor" was akin to what we now
call the common man. "Actually, the gentlemen of England judged all persons poor
who did not command an income sufficient to keep them in leisure." KARL POLANYI,
THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 87 (1944). These men were "conspicuous as individu-
als unattached to the manor, 'or to any feudal superior."' Id. at 104. But there were
many causes of the great increase in poor individuals as the industrial age got
underway:
Amongst [these] were scarcity of grain; too high agricultural wages, causing
high food prices; too low agricultural wages; too high urban wages; irregular-
ity of urban employment; disappearance of the yeomanry; ineptitude of the
urban worker for rural occupations; reluctance of the farmer to pay higher
wages; the landlords' fear that rents would have to be reduced if higher
wages were paid; failure of the work house to compete with machinery; want
of domestic economy; incommodious habitations; bigoted diets; drug habits.
Some writers blamed a new type of large sheep; others, horses which should
be replace by oxen; still others urged the keeping of fewer dogs. Some writ-
ers believed that the poor should eat less, or no, bread, while others thought
that even feeding on the "best bread should not be charged against them."
Tea impaired the health of many poor, it was thought, while "home brewed
beer" would restore it.
Id. at 90.
56. See generally PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52; Mohl, supra note 12, at 39
(disputing use of public assistance programs for social control, but agreeing that his-
torically, "it was generally believed [that those in need] had come to their dependent
state through personal failings such as immorality, idleness, intemperance, improvi-
dence, and so on").
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[t]here is no harvest or paycheck to enforce work and the senti-
ments that uphold work; without work, people cannot conform
to familial and communal roles; and if the dislocation is wide-
spread, the legitimacy of the social order itself may come to be
questioned. The result is usually civil disorder-crime, mass
protests, riots-a disorder that may even threaten to overturn
existing social and economic arrangements. It is then that relief
programs are initiated or expanded.
However, simply providing aid to quiet the unemployed will
not stop disorder; it may even permit it to worsen, for although
the remedy may prevent workers' starvation, the trigger that
sets off disorder is not economic distress itself but the deteriora-
tion of social control. To restore order, the society must create
the means to reassert its authority. Because the market is una-
ble to control men's behavior, at least for a time, a surrogate
system of social control must be evolved, at least for a time.
Moreover, if the surrogate system is to be consistent with nor-
mally dominant patterns, it must restore people to work roles.57
Some early seekers of the causes of dependency also proposed
overtly eugenic explanations.
In "Seeking the Ultimate causes of Dependence," the final
chapter of a long report, [Chester Lee Carlisle, M.D.] stated [the
causes] bluntly. . . . "The story of the poor," he wrote, "is best
read in the annals of cases of mental defect, affective deviation
and all the other psychopathic reactions of conduct .... All
such types constitute the subnormals of the human race."58
The moral and behavioral dimension of dependence was reas-
serted in the mid-twentieth century in the aftermath of the Civil
Rights and welfare rights movements. The resurgence of this as-
pect of the discourse tied persistent, intergenerational dependency
to the existence a culture of poverty. The modern ascension of this
theory began in 1968 when anthropologist Oscar Lewis first for-
mally proposed it after he studied the poor of Mexico.59 The idea
that there might be a behavioral component to poverty was, of
course, not new. Lewis' work, however, focused on the idea that
"the culture of poverty in modern nations is not only a matter of
economic deprivation, of disorganization, or of the absence of
something. It is also something positive and provides some re-
57. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52, at 7-8.
58. MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 191 (1996).
59. Oscar Lewis, The Culture of Poverty, in ON UNDERSTANDING POVERTY: PER-
SPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 187 (Daniel Patrick Moynihan ed., 1968).
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wards without which the poor could hardly carry on. "6 Since 1968,
commentators and policymakers have elaborated and transformed
the notion of a culture of poverty and connected it to the social
problem of dependency.
Lewis believed that a particular set of conditions was necessary
for the growth of a culture of poverty, and that the development of
that culture was an adaptive response to those conditions.61 Of
particular importance for the development of a culture of poverty
in a given population was their feeling of individual and commu-
nity isolation from and lack of identification with other larger
groups. Indeed, Lewis did not believe that the growth of a culture
of poverty was universal among the poverty stricken. Lewis ob-
served that poor people who were organized or part of a move-
ment that promoted solidarity, a sense of identity or place in the
society, and hope for change were much less likely to exhibit the
so-called cultural traits.62
Lewis viewed the development of a culture of poverty as "re-
present[ing] an effort to cope with feelings of hopelessness and de-
spair that develop from the realization of the improbability of
achieving success in terms of the values and goals of the larger soci-
ety. ' '63 But Lewis believed that it was more than just an individual
reaction to being in a marginal position in a stratified capitalistic
society. Once present in a society, the culture of poverty repre-
sented a basic change in personal and community values and atti-
tudes that were inter-generationally transmitted and perpetuated.'
In addition, Lewis believed that participation in social institutions
such as educational or public relief systems did not necessarily ar-
rest the development of a culture of poverty, but instead might
contribute to it.65 It was these ideas that were further developed
and transformed by later social scientists and commentators.
60. Id.
61. Those elements were: a cash and wage-labor based and profit driven economy,
high rates of unemployment and underemployment of unskilled laborers, low wages,
lack of social, political, and economic organization of the low-income population, a
bilateral kinship system, and the existence of a dominant set of values stressing ac-
cumulation of wealth and upward mobility, and that poverty is the result of personal
failure. Id. at 187-188.
62. Id. at 193. Up to and throughout the American Civil Rights struggle of the
1960s, a so-called culture of dependency did not manifest itself among African Ameri-
cans despite their desperate poverty because of a feeling and history of solidarity and
community within that group.
63. Id. at 188.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 189.
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When Lewis identified the traits typical of. a culture of poverty,
he included characteristics that might be common at the commu-
nity, family, and individual levels. Some of these traits include an
awareness and claim of middle class values without practicing
them; a minimum of organization beyond the family; transiency; 66
"absence of childhood as a prolonged and protected stage in the
life cycle[;] ' '67 lack of privacy; early, frequent sexual involvement;
female-centered families and competition for maternal affections;
frequent abandonment of wives and children;68 "lack of impulse
control; strong present-time orientation, with relatively little ability
to defer gratification; ' '69 "high tolerance for psychological pathol-
ogy of all sorts; ' 70 "little sense of history"'7 1 or awareness of the
troubles others; and "strong feelings of marginality, of helplessness,
of dependence, and of inferiority. 72
Lewis argued that the adoption of these features and values ac-
tually provided the poor with rewards or positive experiences that
would otherwise be unattainable. "[F]or example, the low aspira-
tion level helps reduce frustration, the legitimization of short-range
hedonism makes possible spontaneity and enjoyment. '73 In addi-
tion, unlike later commentators, Lewis carefully emphasized that
nothing inherent in poor people causes either them or their com-
munities necessarily to develop a culture of poverty.74 He argued
that the development of the traits associated with the culture of
poverty in a given segment of the poor requires the presence of
certain social conditions.75 But he did conclude that because of the
inter-generational, psychological, and behavioral aspects of the cul-
ture of poverty, elimination of these traits, once present, would re-
quire more effort than would improving the individual's material
status.76
Lewis' controversial ideas about the existence of a culture of
poverty sparked much denouncement and praise in both the aca-
66. Id. at 190.
67. Id. at 191.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 192.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 192.
73. Id. at 197.
74. Id. at 193. He also explicitly stated that there was nothing in his concept of the
culture of poverty "that puts the onus of poverty on the character of the poor." Id. at
199.
75. Id. at 187.
76. Id. at 199.
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demic and popular press, and it contributed to a dramatic shift in
the focus of poverty discussion, and in the behavioral models in-
forming that discussion. This shift included a distinct change in
policy focus away from elimination of poverty and toward minimiz-
ing dependency. Whereas during and after the Great Depression
societal critiques and government policy focused upon the struc-
ture of the U.S. economy and models of rational choice, after
Lewis' article, the focus turned to the apparently distorted and un-
healthy values of poor people, and models of expectancy and
culture. 7
The rational choice model focuses on individual behavior and
assumes that all individuals, whether poor or not, rationally engage
in utility, or satisfaction, maximizing behavior.78 The assumptions
of a rational choice model include the presumption that a poor in-
dividual has agency over both his preference and his choices. In
addition, in its pure form, it does not legitimize one set of prefer-
ences over another, other than the inherent ordering of prefer-
ences in favor of wealth or utility maximization. This model comes
closest to the individualist model, because it favors the indepen-
dent exercise of an individual's will; the individual is free to order
her own tastes and preferences and to act to maximize them.
In contrast, expectancy and cultural models of behavior posit dif-
ferent assumptions about individual behavior. Expectancy models
focus on the interdependence of an individual's choices with her
confidence that she will succeed at her choice.79 Consequently, an
individual might not opt to participate in a training or education
program because she does not have the confidence that she will
succeed at getting a good job in any case. Cultural models, on the
other hand, emphasize individually held social norms through the
suggestion that poor people receiving state assistance actually have
different values from the dominant social class that affect the deci-
sions that they will make.80
Since Lewis presented his ideas, the social traits he identified
with the culture of poverty have become central to the moral regis-
ter of dependency rhetoric. The contemporary version of this cul-
tural or moral register of dependency is present in a new political
77. David T. Ellwood, Understanding Dependency, in WELFARE REALITIES: FROM
RHETORIC TO REFORM 67-68 (Mary Jo Bane & David T. Ellwood eds., 1994).
78. Id. at 68-74. This model, as Professors Bane and Ellwood describe it, focuses
entirely on the choices confronting an individual.
79. Id. at 75.
80. Id. at 80.
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concern about the "underclass" and the apparently distinctive cul-
ture in which its members live.81 As Christopher Jencks has de-
scribed it, "By the late eighties ... a fairly broad consensus had
developed that the underclass was a subset of the poor and that it
included only those families and individuals whose poverty was
somehow attributable to their behavior. "82
In the context of the debate about welfare and work, some com-
mentators who concentrate on the morality of a dependent class
reject the existence of structural poverty altogether.83 Many others
combine the two concerns, attributing poverty to causes such as
long term joblessness, employment and residential mismatch,
suburbanization, and changes in the global economy, while at the
same time asserting that the existence of intergenerational, hard
core poverty can lead to underclass behavior and dependency.84
Those commentators who reject structural poverty theories, in-
cluding Charles Murray and Lawrence Mead,85 argue that the shift
in American policy and philosophy away from blaming individuals
for their poverty and toward blaming systemic causes, combined
with the permissiveness of the welfare system and the availability
of cash assistance, has contributed to the development of depen-
dency as a social problem. By this they seem to mean that the
change from a premise that stigmatized individuals for relying on
state assistance, to one that blamed the system and diminished the
status of work, resulted in a change in the moral fibre of poor indi-
viduals. In their views, welfare recipiency actually changes recipi-
ents' morals for the worse; it saps them of their work ethic and has
a deforming effect on their communities.86
81. JUNE AXINN & MARK J. STERN, DEPENDENCY AND POVERTY: OLD PROBLEMS
IN A NEW WORLD 98-99 (1988). See generally CHRISTOPHER JENCKS, RETHINKING
SOCIAL POLICY: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE UNDERCLASS 145 (1993); WILLIAM J.
WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
82. JENCKS, supra note 81, at 145.
83. "Structural poverty" refers to a view of poverty and inequality as a product of
the capitalist economy itself. It posits that no matter the level of economic growth, the
system itself perpetuates inequality through policies that encourage massive capital
accumulation, unequal distribution of income, and maintenance of unemployment,
among others. Charles Murray puts it more bluntly. He characterizes structural pov-
erty as the destructive view that "[p]overty was not the fault of the individual but of
the system." MURRAY, supra note 12, at 29.
84. JENCKS, supra note 81; WILSON, supra note 81.
85. E.g., MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT, supra note 6 at 21, 24; MURRAY, LOSING
GROUND, supra note 12 at 26-29; Charles A. Murray, Redefinition of Rights: Its De-
forming Effect on Communities, 1 MICH. L. & POL'Y. REV. 291, 291-92 (1996).
86. Murray, supra note 85.
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There are, however, differences even within this position-illus-
trative of this point is the disagreement between Murray and
Mead. Although both conclude that dependency is deforming to
the individual and the community,87 they begin with different
premises and end with different policy solutions. Murray's theory,
by eliminating the assumption that poor individuals do not act ra-
tionally, remains tied to the individualist pole of dependency rheto-
ric in a way that Mead's does not.88 Indeed, Murray's position is
that welfare benefits are so generous that any rational poor person
who engages in an assessment of the relative benefits of marriage,
work, and welfare, will rationally conclude that relying on govern-
ment assistance is the better option.89 The result of this calculus is
that individuals are sapped of their motivation to work, to contrib-
ute, and to better themselves-an ethic that they then transmit to
their children. Accordingly, Murray's solution is simply to eradi-
cate welfare assistance. 90
Mead, conversely, espouses an overt paternalism that is tied to
the second pole-social contract theory. 91 In Mead's view, depen-
dent individuals should not be allowed to exercise their will freely
if in so doing they will deviate from certain social norms.92 He as-
serts that unlike
traditional policy [which] assumes [that poor individuals] will
usually follow the interests of society but leaves them free to
diverge, paternalism assumes that they may not follow society's
interests and seeks to prevent their divergence. Individuals' de-
cisions about their own self-interest are not routinely deferred
to. Rather, a harmony of interests is assumed: enforcing soci-
87. Id.; MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT, supra note 6, at ch.2.
88. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND, supra note 12, at 161-62.
89. Id. at 155, 161-162.
90. Murray, Redefinition of Rights, supra note 86, at 295.
91. Lawrence Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in THE NEW PATERNALISM 1, 4
(Lawrence Mead ed., 1997); MEAD, supra note 6, at 241-258. Mead specifies distinct
social as opposed to legal duties relating to an individual's interaction with other citi-
zens, including: (1) work; (2) economically supporting obedience in the law; (3) flu-
ency in the English language; (4) obedience of the law; (5) learning sufficient
education or skills to be employable. Id. at 242-43.
92. Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 91, at 2. Mead actively asserts that
strict supervision of an individual's conformity should be a condition of all govern-
ment largesse. He views the goal not as simply punishment and control of behavior
ex-post, but as a measure to prevent behavior through supervision and adherence to
social obligations; see Joel F. Handler, Constructing the Political Spectacle: The Inter-
pretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56
BROOK. L. REV. 899, 903-05 (1990).
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ety's interest in good behavior is deemed to serve the individ-
ual's interest as well.93
According to Mead's argument, public assistance recipients are de-
pendent upon state assistance in the same manner a drug addict is
dependent upon his narcotic, and for these reasons, the govern-
ment is justified in imposing strict, authoritarian, paternalist rules
on these dependent individuals.
Mead's ideas about dependency and paternalism are explicitly
and deeply informed by the theory that civil society is a social con-
tract or agreement to which citizens are bound. The same seven-
teenth century philosophers who argued for possessive
individualism espoused this social contract theory, but with a dif-
ferent emphasis. They focused on the rights men relinquish, the
privileges they obtain, and the obligations they must perform when
they agree to enter into civil society. For Locke and Hobbes, for
example, it meant relinquishing rights of enforcement and civil war
for the protection of private property, liberty, and labor.
According to these theories of dependency, there remains a uni-
versal, definable American social compact that includes adherence
to certain norms of behavior and morality. Dependent individuals
are persons who fail to live up to these obligatory norms. 94 Such
norms might favor sex and childbirth in marriage, privilege work
over non-work for certain groups of able-bodied individuals, sup-
port a two-parent heterosexual family structure, and favor individ-
ual accumulation of wealth and property.95 For Mead, the failure
of an individual to meet his mutual obligations justifies government
imposition of paternalist, behavior-controlling regulation,96 while
for Murray it justifies elimination of the social safety net
altogether.97
Theorists who emphasize this moral register of dependency dis-
tinguish between independent and dependent individuals based on
93. Mead, supra note 91, at 4.
94. MEAD, BEYOND ENTITLEMENT, supra note 6, at 247 (providing an example of
the author using the term "dependent" to refer to individuals who should be subject
to compulsion).
95. See generally Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 91; Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110
Stat. 2110 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601 (Supp. 1998) ("PRWORA")), the
amended federal welfare law. In the PRWORA, the United States Congress found
that "marriage is an essential institution of a successful society which promotes the
interests of children"). Id.; United States Statutes at Large, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 1996,
v.110 pt.3, at 1755.
96. Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, supra note 91, at 10.
97. Murray, supra note 12, at 227-33.
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a perceived need to affect how the dependent individual makes her
life decisions. For example, Mead and Murray both assume the
existence of a set of values to which independent members of soci-
ety adhere and against which non-conforming individuals are
judged as dependent. They also both conclude that society should
foster certain kinds of decision-makihg.
C. Dependence and Relations with the State
Another strand of dependency discourse focuses on the relation-
ship that individuals have with the state. No longer is American
society engaged in a war on poverty; rather it is occupied with elim-
inating state or public dependency. Government welfare policy fo-
cuses not simply on changing the level of an individual's income
through cash or in-kind assistance, but on mandating that the indi-
vidual's income come from a source other than the state. 98 Policy
advocates who focus on the source of an individual's income do not
necessarily make judgments either about an individual's capacity
or moral fibre. Instead, these theorists seem to be concerned with
one of two things; either they seek to encourage a social norm that
individuals are responsible for privately economically supporting
themselves and their families, or they are alarmed by state eco-
nomic coercion of individuals through state policy that requires in-
dividuals to relinquish personal rights in order to obtain economic
support from the government.
An early example of the first of these two uses, the dependence/
poverty distinction, is seen in Karl Polanyi's description of the
Speenhamland Law, which was in effect in England from 1795 to
1834. 99 The Speenhamland Law was an alternative to the harsh
Poor Laws. It provided "subsidies in aid of wages," and was in-
tended to relieve the desperate need and concomitant social unrest
brought on by industrialization.' ° According to Polanyi, at the be-
ginning of the industrial revolution, the Speenhamland Law
worked to repress the formation of a market in labor because "no-
body would work for a wage if he could make a living by doing
nothing... [; t]he 'right to live' had proved a deathtrap."'' 1 In this
way, the effect of the law was apparently opposite than its propo-
98. Michael Morris & John B. Williamson, Workfare: The Poverty/Dependence
Trade-Off, Soc. POL'Y, Summer 1987, at 13.
99. POLANYI, supra note 55, at 78.
100. Id. at 78-79; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52, at 30.
101. POLANYI, supra note 55, at 78-79.
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nents had intended; the law seemed to increase rather than dimin-
ish poverty and public dependency.
Under Elizabethan Law the poor were forced to work at
whatever wages they could get and only those who could obtain
no work were entitled to relief; relief in aid of wages [i.e. for the
working poor,] was neither intended nor given. Under the
Speenhamland Law a man was relieved even if he was in em-
ployment, as long as his wages amounted to less than the family
income granted to him by the scale. Hence, no laborer had any
material interest in satisfying his employer, his income being the
same whatever wages he earned; this was different only in case
standard wages, i.e., the wages actually paid, exceeded the scale,
an occurrence which was not the rule in the countryside since
the employer could obtain labor at almost any wages; however
little he paid, the subsidy from the rates brought the workers'
income up to scale. Within a few years the productivity of labor
began to sink to that of pauper labor, thus provided an added
reason for employers not to raise wages above the scale. For,
once the intensity of labor, the care and efficiency with which it
was performed dropped below a definite level, it became indis-
tinguishable from "boondoggling" or the semblance of work
maintained for the sake of appearances. 0 2
As Polanyi described it, because the worker would earn a lesser
amount than he could obtain while on relief, he became a pauper
or state dependent. The law sapped him of his drive and of his
work ethic and encouraged in him a preference for a relationship
of dependence on the state.
Contrary to this description, however, the Speenhamland Law
ultimately did not result in a complete end to wage labor, because
individuals remained motivated by factors other than wage levels.
Indeed, the increase at that time in individuals dependent on state
relief could not be attributed to the Speenhamland Law alone.
For,
[i]f laborers had been free to combine for the furtherance of
their interests, the allowance system might ... have had a con-
trary effect on standard wages: for trade union action would
have been greatly helped by the relief of the unemployed im-
plied in so liberal an administration of the Poor Law. °3
In short, the Speenhamland Law interacted with the economic, so-
cial, and other legal structures of the time-anti-combination laws,
102. Id. at 79.
103. Id. at 81.
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compulsory work laws, and settlement laws. °4 "Laborers could
not organize, they could not refuse work, they could not exploit
labor shortages to demand higher wages, and they could not move
to new localities to find better working conditions."' 5
"The complicated economics of Speenhamland transcended the
comprehension of even the most expert observers of the time; but
the conclusion appeared only the more compelling that aid-in-
wages must be inherently vicious, since it miraculously injured
even those who received it."'1 6 Still, the community preferred reli-
ance on private sources of economic support not merely because it
was better for the individuals, but because it was better for the pro-
gress of capitalism and civilization. 10 7
In the modern strand of this discourse, commentators also deni-
grate reliance upon the state for economic support. If an individ-
ual relies upon the state to support either herself or those
individuals for whom she is responsible, she is in a destructive rela-
tionship, she has lost a measure of self-respect. For an individual
to be independent, she must not rely upon the state to provide ei-
ther for herself, her children and spouse, or other immediate family
members. These policy-makers focus on strategies to increase the
individual's self-respect by encouraging the person's ability to
maintain these private relationships of economic support.10 8 That
these norms are present is clear in the law, for these particular rela-
tionships of economic support are also, to some extent, mandated
and enforceable by recourse to the courts. 10 9 But these policy mak-
ers also focus on other dependent relationships in which good will
or moral obligation of family blood is the only basis for provision
of economic support. Siblings may support one another if parents
are no longer living, parents may rely upon children in their old
age, and individuals may support their grandchildren or nieces and
nephews, despite having no legal obligation to do so. Law and pol-
icy encourage individuals to undertake these relationships of pri-
104. See generally id. at 78-83; PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52, at 36-38.
105. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52, at 37.
106. POLANYI, supra note 55, at 82.
107. Id. at 83-85. The interests of society and individuals were co-extensive, so that
the individual was expected to submit to the perils of the market "even if it happened
to destroy him." Id. at 85.
108. Mary Jo Bane, Increasing Self-Sufficiency by Reforming Welfare, in WELFARE
REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM, supra note 77, at 124-125.
109. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (West 1998) ("Husband and wife contract toward
each other obligations of mutual respect, fidelity, and support."); MAss. GEN. L. ch.
209, § 1 (1994) ("[B]oth spouses shall be liable jointly or severally for debts incurred
on account of necessaries furnished to either spouse or to a member of their family.").
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vate economic dependency, for example, by allowing the provider
to deduct a certain amount of income from his public tax bill for
each private dependent relationship.
Policy makers who are concerned about reinforcing these social
obligations of economic care focus on dependency as the opposite
of economic self-sufficiency." 0 Although these policy analysts cer-
tainly seek to change individual behavior so that it conforms to
their preferred social norms,"' they do not overtly cast depen-
dency as a problem of individual morality. For example, Mary Jo
Bane and Thomas J. Kane advocate changes in systems of welfare
service delivery that promote an institutional culture of compe-
tency for the caseworkers as well as a change in recipient behav-
ior.1 12 Bane and like-minded commentators admit that structural
and system-wide influences contribute to an individual's poverty."13
In addition to providing incentives that encourage desired behav-
iors, they advocate policy and management decisions to foster cli-
ent-worker relations that are cooperative and respectful, benefit
structures and rules that are understandable, and a system of pre-
dictable consequences and actions." 4 These policy-makers begin
to take on questions about how paternalist policies that treat poor
individuals as less capable might contribute to, rather than dimin-
ish, dependency. The critical dimension captured by the use of
"dependent" to denote this lack of self-sufficiency, however, is the
concept that a relationship in which a person relies upon the state
is inherently destructive to the person's independence. In contrast,
other relations of private dependence, seemingly free from state
regulation-relations between family members, spouses, parents,
and children-are natural and benign forms of dependence that
policy-makers encourage.
A second strand of the discourse that emphasizes an individual's
relationship with the state focuses on the power of the state to co-
erce persons to relinquish individual rights when they depend upon
the state for economic support. This concern about the conse-
quences of pervasive economic dependence on the state is elabo-
110. Bane, supra note 108, at 124-125.
111. Such measure might include increasing child support payments and making
work more desirable.
112. Mary Jo Bane & Thomas J. Kane, The Context for Welfare Reform, in WEL-
FARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM, supra note 77, at 2-7; Bane, supra
note 108, at 125-27.
113. See generally WELFARE REALITIES: FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM, supra note
77; JENCKS, supra note 81; WILSON, supra note 81.
114. Bane, supra note 108, at 125-127.
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rated by legal theorists who focus on entitlements." 5 Charles
Reich detailed this notion of dependency in his influential 1964 ar-
ticle, The New Property.116 Sounding the same themes as the pos-
sessive individualists before him,'17 Reich wrote a clarion Call to
libertarians about the threat that economic dependence on the
state posed to individual freedom.'"8 Reich presented a view of all
men existing in a world dominated by the state and private, eco-
nomically powerful conglomerates: a world of utterly dependent
individuals and entities.119 In Reich's world, these forces were so
pervasive and controlling that the individual needed protection
against the excesses of that control to secure her liberties. 2 ° In
Reich's vision, the coercive power of the State was negative, and
invocation of property rights was the only way to retain any level
of individual liberty.' 21
As with individualist theory, in Reich's theory, property rights
act as the principal guardian of "the troubled boundary between
individual man and the state.' 1 22 Reich believed that "the power
to control a particular portion of [material] well-being is the very
foundation of individuality. ' 123 He viewed property rights as giv-
ing individuals such control by creating zones of autonomy into
which neither another private party nor the state could intrude.124
Property draws a circle around the activities of each private in-
dividual or organization. Within that circle, the owner has a
greater degree of freedom than without. Outside, he must jus-
tify or explain his actions, and show his authority. Within, he is
master, and the state must explain and justify any interference
.... Thus, property performs the function of maintaining inde-
pendence, dignity and pluralism in a society by creating zones
within which the majority has to yield to the owner. Whim, ca-
price, irrationality and "antisocial" activities are given the pro-
115. Reich, supra note 13. Compare MEAD, supra note 6, at 249-50 (expressing con-
cern about entitlements, but also focusing on the obligations that are or should be
attendant to them).
116. Reich, supra note 13.
117. Supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
118. Id. It was not, however, strictly libertarian in the sense that Reich did not
advocate only for less government intrusion, or dismantling systems of government
largesse.
119. Id. at 756-60.
120. Id. at 760-64.
121. Id. at 771-74, 785-87.
122. Id. at 733.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 771.
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tection of law; the owner may do what all or most of his
neighbors decry. 125
Since the seventeenth century, sources of individual wealth
changed dramatically from traditional forms such as privately held
land and personal property to wealth acquired in the form of "gov-
ernment largesse.' 1 26 Reich was concerned about individual reli-
ance upon this largesse because it offered no zone of legal
protection similar to that offered by traditional private property.
For the same reason, Reich was also concerned about government
action that had the effect of conferring status upon individuals. He
emphasized:
[Tioday more and more of our wealth takes the form of rights or
status rather than of tangible goods. An individual's profession
or occupation is a prime example .... A profession or job is
frequently far more valuable than a house or bank account, for a
new house can be bought, and a new bank account created, once
a profession or job is secure. For the jobless, their status as gov-
ernmentally assisted or insured persons may be the main source
of subsistence . . . . To the individual, these new forms [of
wealth], such as a profession, job, or right to receive income, are
the basis of his various statuses in society, and may therefore be
the most meaningful and distinctive wealth he possesses.12 7
These kinds of wealth, intangible status and rights in private and
government largesse, were considered a "privilege" in the
Hohfeldian framework of jural relations, and thus contingent.12 8
The combination of the growing prevalence of government largesse
and the state's ability to condition or regulate its receipt created
dependence. Reich concluded that "the object of the whole system
is to enforce 'the public interest'-the interest of the state or soci-
ety or the lord paramount-by means of the distribution and use of
wealth in such a way as to create and maintain [citizen] depen-
dence" on the state. 2 9 By subjugating the individual's rights to this
coercive public interest, this system harkened toward the evils
Reich saw as characteristic of collective societies. 130
Reich thus focused on dependency as a coercive economic rela-
tion to the state. Although he acknowledged that the regulatory
state was needed to counteract great accumulations of private
125. Id.
126. Id. at 733.
127. Id. at 738-739.
128. See generally Joseph Singer, supra note 3; Reich, supra note 13, at 740.
129. Reich, supra note 13, at 770.
130. Id.
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wealth accompanying the rise of industry and corporations, it was
the extent of state control of individuals that most informed his
objection. Reich's new property ideal would create a new zone of
independence where now there was dependence on the state.'3
Independence was an individual's ability to engage in non-con-
formist thought and action, an ability that individuals secured
through the vehicle of private property. 32 Troubled by the new
forms of wealth and property, and inequality in its distribution,
Reich concluded that it was necessary to expand property rights to
include other forms of wealth or status now held by the majority of
citizens, including poor ones. 133 To protect an area of non-con-
formity of individual action and to decrease dependence, Reich ad-
vocated an expanded view of what should be considered property
and a reversion to the liberal purpose of securing individual liberty.
Reich's idea of a new kind of property right was adopted, to a
limited extent, in 1970 in Goldberg v. Kelly. '31 In Goldberg, the
Supreme Court determined that the Social Security Act created an
entitlement to public assistance for eligible recipients under the
Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. For the first
time, individuals could claim rights and procedures in the provision
of state assistance. Goldberg, however, was the outer limit of the
New Property doctrine, 35 a doctrine that withered before it
reached Reich's full vision. It took Congress only twenty-five years
to eliminate the entitlement contained in that legislation, clarifying
that state assistance remained nothing more than a gratuity upon
which only the most destitute and dejected individuals could
rely.' 36
D. Dependence and Productivity
Whether and to what extent individuals participate in produc-
tive, paid labor is also a central concern of dependence discourse.
Themes of labor and work in the images and rhetorical uses of de-
pendency are prominent in the three strands of the discourse that I
have so far described. Individualist theory posits labor as neces-
131. Id. at 787.
132. Id. at 771-74.
133. Id. at 787.
134. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
135. Handier, supra note 92, at 899-900.
136. PuB. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2113 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601
(1996)) (clarifying that individuals have no entitlement to state assistance); Lucy A.
Williams, Welfare and Legal Entitlements: The Social Roots of Poverty, in THE POLIT-
ICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 575 (3d ed. 1998).
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sary to the creation of private property, the institution through
which independence is secured. 137 The positive moral virtue inher-
ent in and produced by work is also evident; individuals who do not
work, but are apparently able to do so, are morally deficient. In
addition, laboring in the private wage market to support one's de-
pendent family members is normatively preferred to relying upon
the state for income. 138 The connection between work and free-
dom is so deep in the discourse, however, that I consider the theme
of productivity on its own. In the final register of dependence that
I identify, an individual's productivity in the wage-labor market is
the distinguishing feature of the rhetoric. When commentators and
theoreticians invoke work as a means to liberation, they commonly
also appeal to any or all of the other three strands of the
discourse. 39
There is a wide consensus in the United States that work is nor-
matively good. Such consensus is unsurprising, for without produc-
tive work, we would not be able to live at all, much less at the high
standards that we do. Productive labor sustains a community of
interests that society shares, and unquestionably, for many individ-
uals, the wealth that one accrues through paid labor is a means to
achieve economic stability, nourishment, shelter, and other necessi-
ties of life. Work also provides necessary and healthy psychic re-
wards to many individuals as they gain a feeling of self-worth and
challenge. The consensus, however, goes beyond a collective
agreement that work is necessary to live. Depending upon an indi-
vidual's economic class, wage workers as a group enjoyed pre-
ferred social status over non-workers. 40 Moreover, for certain
137. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 3, 200-01; LOCKE, supra note 5.
138. See generally MEAD, supra note 6.
139. AXINN & STERN, supra note 81, at 31-48. Productivity itself is difficult to de-
fine, Axinn and Stern identify four dimensions to dependency in this mode: (1) labor
market participation; (2) socially useful production, including non-market work; (3)
poor who depend on public money, or the "impotent poor"; (4) poor who depend on
public money that is not tied to labor market participation. The last of these would
categorize individuals who rely on programs such as unemployment or social security
as independent, and reserve the category of dependent for individuals who rely upon
social assistance programs like food stamps. Id. at 41. The authors point out that even
with only these four definitions of dependency, approximately forty-six percent of the
population would fall into ambiguous categories of dependency. "By some standards,
[these individuals] are independent or productive; by others they are dependent." Id.
at 43.
140. American individualism "foster[ed] the belief that any hard-working virtuous
man could support his family in independence and dignity." Mohl, supra note 12, at
39. Needy people who did not work were viewed as idle, shallow, or immoral. Id.; see
MURRAY, supra note 12, at 179-80.
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members of the community, the responsibility to work in paid la-
bor is part of the social compact and the "American dream.'
'1 41
Along with monetary wages, work provides dignity, pride, moral-
ity, and independence. Indeed, the dominant societal belief has
been that:
[E]conomic individualism-the unshakable conviction held by
poor and affluent alike that rags could indeed be converted into
riches. The doctrine of self-help through work which distin-
guished nineteenth century capitalism flourished in its purest
and fiercest form in the United States. By contrast with other
countries, where some residue remained of earlier Christian
teachings that poverty was a blessing that should inspire charity
in the rich and meekness in the poor, poverty in the United
States came to be regarded as the obvious consequence of sloth
and sinfulness. The promise of America was not affluence but
independence; not ease, but a chance to work for oneself, to be
self-supporting, and to win esteem through hard and honest
labor.14
2
What remains unstated in this belief about work is an even higher
social preference for capital accumulation and independent wealth,
plus a definition of productive labor that discounts the value and
status of certain types of work.
In Part I.A. I described Locke's focus on individual capacity as a
defining mark of independence. Locke, however, withheld the la-
bel independent from more persons than those obviously without
the requisite capacity, such as young children, lunatics, idiots, and
madmen. 143 Indeed, Locke classified the laboring class itself as a
group of individuals incapable of the full rational behavior that
marks independent men. 144 C.B. Macpherson has argued that
Locke did this by reading the class differentials of the seventeenth
century into his theory of natural rights.145 Macpherson explains:
141. "The 'American dream'-of a rewarding job, a home, and a family and com-
munity to take pride in-cannot be conferred by government fiat. It must be earned,
as it has been by generations of Americans, through diligence and honesty-in short,
by personal responsibility." James A. Baker III, Confronting the Matter of Personal
Responsibility, L.A. TIMES, Jul. 10, 1994, at M3. Thus, work provides more than eco-
nomic gains; it also provides spiritual and personal benefits.
142. PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 52, at 46 (quoting ROBERT H. BREMNER,
FROM THE DEPTHS: THE DISCOVERY OF POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 16-17
(1956) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
143. LOCKE, supra note 5, at § 60.
144. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 221-22.
145. The existence of class differential exists in twentieth century liberal theory as
well. Milton Friedman has explicitly acknowledged these material inequalities:
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It was because Locke had always assumed fully rational beha-
viour to be accumulative behaviour that he could, at the point
[in the theory] where labouring and appropriating [property] be-
came separable, find that full rationality lay in appropriating
rather than in labouring. 146
Locke's theory expounded how this differential was estab-
lished. 147 In nature, a man's property was limited to only the
amount that he could use before it spoiled.148 "As much land as a
man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of,
so much [was] his property.1' 49 But, this egalitarian measure and
distribution of individual property, and with it, liberty, contradicted
the existing unequal distribution of wealth. Locke accounted for
and legitimized great accumulation of wealth and property in soci-
ety by reasoning that men who traded for durable things the per-
ishable fruits of their property could accumulate greater property
rights without jeopardizing either their right to title or the laws of
nature. Rather, it was the waste of products by spoilage that af-
fronted the law of nature, not the accumulation of material durable
things beyond one's ability to consume.
He that gathered a hundred bushels of acorns or apples, had
thereby a property in them, they were his goods as soon as gath-
ered. He was only to look, that he used them before they
spoiled, else he took more than his share and robbed others.
And indeed it was a foolish thing, as well as dishonest, to hoard
up more than he could make use of. If he gave away a part to
any body else, so that it perished not uselesly (sic) in his posses-
sion, these he also made use of. And if he also bartered away
plums, that would have rotted in a week, for nuts that would last
good for his eating a whole year, he did no injury; he wasted not
The heart of the liberal philosophy is a belief in the dignity of the individual,
in his freedom to make the most of his own capacities and opportunities
according to his own lights, subject only to the proviso that he not interfere
with the freedom of other individuals to do the same. This implies a belief in
the equality of man in one sense; in their inequality in another .... The
liberal will ... distinguish sharply between equality of rights and equality of
opportunity, on the one hand, and material equality or equality of outcome
on the other. He may welcome the fact that a free society in fact tends to-
ward greater material equality than any other yet tried. But he will regard
this as a desirable by-product of a free society, not its major justification.
Milton Friedman, Liberalism and Egalitarianism, in POVERTY, ECONOMICS AND SOCI-
ETY 282 (Helen Ginsburg ed., 1972).
146. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 236.
147. April L. Cherry, Social Contract Theory, Welfare Reform, Race, and the Male
Sex-Right, 75 OR. L. REv. 1037, 1054-1055 (1996).
148. LOCKE, supra note 5, at § 27.
149. Id. § 32.
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the common stock; destroyed no part of the portion of goods
that belonged to others, so long as nothing perished uselesly
(sic) in his hands. Again, if he would give his nuts for a piece of
metal, pleased with its colour; or exchange his sheep for shells,
or wool for a sparkling pebble or a diamond, and keep those by
him all his life, he invaded not the right of others, he might heap
up as much of these durable things as he pleased; the exceeding
of bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of his
possession, but the perishing of any thing uselesly (sic) in it. 5 °
The exchange of durable things for perishable ones was, accord-
ing to Locke, by tacit and voluntary consent, a valuable trade for
the preservation of man despite the resultant inequality.151 Moreo-
ver, there was no provision for redistribution of such accumulated
wealth despite the existence of deep inequality. Locke simply did
not question unequal status among individuals. Accordingly, he
concluded:
[I]t is plain, that men have agreed [by use of money] to dispro-
portionate and unequal possession of the earth, they having, by
a tacit and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may
fairly possess more land than he himself can use the product of,
by receiving in exchange for the overplus gold and silver, which
may be hoarded up without injury to any one; these metals not
spoiling or decaying in the hands of the possessor. 152
As I have said, Locke asserted that every man has "property"
over his own person. 153 Moreover, man has the same "unquestion-
able property" or dominion over "the labour of his body and the
work of his hands ... ."154 and, the act of mixing a man's labour
with something he removes from the state of nature, is the act of
making private property. 55 Individual freedom is dependent on
the individual's accumulation of this property, for within the limits
of an individual's property, the owner is not only protected in his
actions from the interference of others but also may direct the ac-
tivities of other individuals. 56 Labor is central to the individualist
theory, central to creation of private property and central to
independence.57
150. Id. § 46.
151. Id.
152. Id. § 50.
153. Id. § 27.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. § 39.
157. See id. § 39.
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Locke's idea that a man holds a property right in himself and his
labor that he could freely alienate was not uncommon in colonial
America, nor is it alien today.158 Since colonial times it has been
understood that a master or employer purchased a property inter-
est in another's labor, and in so doing was entitled to retain the
product of that labor. Similarly, a man who worked for himself
was entitled to keep the product of his labor. 5 9 The fact that
workers in the paid labor market generally had no property other
than their labor, and were required to sell it to survive, did not
diminish their freedom.160 The contradiction that property was
freedom from domination, but that men were required to sell that
property-liberty to survive went unacknowledged.' 6' The mere fact
that one was able sell one's labor, in contrast to a slave, rendered
one a free man.162
Only after the onset of industrialization did the modern idea of
the free labor contract become completely familiar to American
law.163 According to this concept, the parties to the employment
contract were viewed as equals-each with the same rights and ob-
ligations. 64 It meant that
[t]he employed [was] under no greater obligation to the em-
ployer than the employer [was] to the employed; and the one
[had] no more right to dictate [conduct outside of work] than
the other. In the eye of the law, they [were] both freemen-
citizens having equal rights, and brethren having one common
destiny.165
But development of this view of the propertyless worker as an
equal to the master or employer did not come quickly either at law
or by custom. The struggle for women and African Americans to
achieve freedom from legally dependent status took even longer.
In The Invention of Free Labor, Robert Steinfeld documents the
development of this concept of free labor that we take as the
norm.166 Steinfeld describes a trajectory commencing at a time
when the natural status of all non-propertied laborers was that of a
158. See MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 215.
159. Id.
160. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 80. The laborer "freely" entered into the wage-
labor agreement.
161. Id. at 106-07.
162. Id. at 53; MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 219.
163. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 15.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See generally STEINFELD, supra note 17.
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dependent person.167 ' The picture painted by Locke, of laboring
men who were less rational than propertied ones, and the rejection
of relief in aid of wages and the Speenhamland experiment in En-
gland were the backdrop for this transformation.
As Steinfeld describes, until the late eighteenth century, only
propertied individuals, usually men, enjoyed the rights and benefits
of fully independent citizens. 168 Some of these men labored to
maintain their lands and to harvest their crops. Others worked in
the sense that they managed their property, slaves, and servants
while being subject only to limited regulation of their work efforts.
Although they were obligated to provide the likes of bed, board,
and medical treatment for those under their care and in their em-
ploy, on the whole, they benefited from what regulation of work
relationships existed. 16 9 Detailed regulations encompassed and re-
stricted the work lives of propertyless individuals. These property-
less individuals who "voluntarily" sold their labor to employers
were nonetheless commanded to work, under the complete control
of their masters, and subject to criminal and corporal penalties for
failure to meet conditions set by both their masters and the law.170
As early as the fourteenth century171 and again in the sixteenth
century, 72 England enacted statutes restricting the activities and
work of the poor:17 3
Both the employed and the unemployed [wage-laborers] had
been the object of much state concern by the Tudor and early
Stuart governments, but neither the labouring nor the idle poor
had been considered capable of political rights. Puritan individ-
ualism, to the extent that it superseded the paternalism of the
167. Id. at 56, 80; Patricia Cooper, A Masculinist Vision of Useful Labor, 84 Ky. L.J.
827, 835 (1996).
168. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 56.
169. Id. at 25-26. The masters/owners of labor benefited in many ways, including in
their ability to control the lives of their workers both on and off the job, id. at 41,
having the right to any product or profit from the labor, id. at 81, having the ability to
use the labor of a servant to satisfy debts. Id. at 90.
170. Id. at 22-24. For a review of the legal and practical conditions under which
servants and laborers toiled in England and the United States, see generally id. at 25-
54.
171. These provisions were developed by the Ordinance and Statute of Laborers.
Id. at 22.
172. The newer, modified provisions were enacted as the Statute of Artificers
(1562-63). Id. at 23.
173. For example, the Statute of Artificers compelled labor in the work of hus-
bandry for all unemployed, non-apprenticed individuals between the ages of twelve
and sixty with no visible means of support. If the individual was unmarried, under the
age of thirty, and had been trained in a craft, he was compelled to accept work from
any person who needed his artistry or mastery. Id.
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Tudor and early Stuart state, did nothing to raise the estimation
of the political capacity of the dependent working class. On the
contrary, the Puritan doctrine of the poor, treating poverty as a
mark of moral shortcoming, added moral obloquy to the politi-
cal disregard in which the poor had always been held. The poor
might deserve to be helped, but it must be done from a superior
moral footing. Objects of solicitude or pity or scorn, and some-
times of fear, the poor were not full members of a moral
community.
174
Given the prevalence of these norms, it is unsurprising that de-
pendent status relationships were the norm.175 Whether under
masters, churches, local officials, or workhouse administrators, a
poor individual was usually subject to the direction and rule of an-
other person. Artisans on the other hand, and individuals possess-
ing a sufficient stock of animals, or a plot of land that could sustain
a family, could plausibly claim to be independent. 176 So long as
they had sufficient material ability to maintain themselves, their
person and labor were not subject to the control of another.177
The justification for this regulation was derived from two
sources: first, the "set of ancient conceptions about proper order in
the domestic household and about the role of the household in the
wider polity[,]"' 78 and second, the view that labor was "a common
resource to which the community had rights .... ",7 Under the
first vision,
[t]he characterization of the household as a hierarchically ar-
ranged polity was common .... [T]hey cast the relationship
between a master and his resident servants as one form of the
relationship heads of household bore to dependent members of
their households. Along with other dependent members of the
household, like wives and children, resident servants were un-
derstood to be subject to a kind of jurisdiction that a head of
household exercised over all household members. 8 °
This hierarchy was similar to that which I already have described
as the common relation between married women and their hus-
bands, and the hierarchy in the greater polity, so that all depen-
dents were considered part of a "household government" and the
174. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 226-27.
175. FRASER & GORDON, supra note 15, at 312; STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 56.
176. Id. at 40.
177. Id.; Cooper, supra note 167, at 835.
178. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 55-56.
179. Id. at 60.
180. Id. at 56.
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master "was understood to be like [other rulers] who governed
[their] polities."' 181
A master's jurisdiction over his resident servants flowed in the
first instance from his status as head of household, but it also
flowed from a decision by the community that right order was
served by giving heads of household jurisdiction over those
among the laboring poor who were not settled, did not have
households of their own, and might otherwise constitute a
source of disruption. 182
It was the propertied master who was independent. He had con-
trol over the finances, personal and real property, education and
employment, possibilities for self-governance, franchise, and the
prerogatives of daily life for the entire household. He could speak
and represent his own and his household's interests in the commu-
nity, he could enter into contracts, and could invoke the power of
the courts to enforce his rights against others. All other members
of his household: wife, child, servant, and slave, were dependents;
they enjoyed only a limited ability, if any, to exercise these
rights. 183
The same strict control of non-resident laborers could not as eas-
ily be justified because they maintained their own households. Al-
though they did not control their destinies to the same extent as
artisans, at least by the eighteenth century, day laborers were con-
sidered "their own masters" when not at work. 184 Although they
did not enjoy the full privileges of self-governance accorded the
land-owning class because they were without public voice or au-
thority, laborers did have a separate, albeit regulated, personal ex-
istence in the community. The regulations under which they were
controlled were justified as "expressions of the jurisdiction that the
community claimed over labor.' 1 85 In essence, through enforce-
ment of legal restrictions on and compulsions to work, the commu-
nity granted a portion of its claim over communal labor to private
individuals, namely masters, who were thereby entitled to call upon
the courts to enforce their claims over the laborers through impris-
onment or fines. 186
181. Id. at 57.
182. Id. at 59.
183. See id. at 56.
184. Id. at 40.
185. Id. at 60.
186. Id.
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Thus, under conceptions of independence that privilege control
over one's person and actions, it cannot be said that these eight-
eenth century non-propertied workers were independent; they
were, by call of the state, subject to the will of their masters. With-
out property, neither social nor legal norms attributed to workers
the autonomy of judgment sufficient to confer independent status.
Rather, "in the republican theory behind the American Revolu-
tion, independence for the citizen ... implied economic indepen-
dence ...along with, and as the underpinning for, freedom of
judgment.' 1 87 Nevertheless, in a limited sense, when contrasted
with slaves and indentured servants, laborers were universally con-
ceived of as independent men.'8 8 Notwithstanding the criminal
sanctions that could be imposed upon them or the fact that they
were selling their only theoretical claim to freedom-control over
their person and labor-the existence of a nominal sense of volun-
tariness and bargaining power to enter into work relationships was
sufficient to denominate these individuals independent.
189
The force of this appearance of voluntariness, however, did not
last in the face of the movement to abolish slavery. The category
of indentured servitude was the first status relationship to succumb
to analogies to slavery, for the terms and conditions of service were
unusually harsh.' 90 American masters had extensive control over
their servants-they could beat them, recapture runaway servants
both by self-help and by recourse to authorities, and could assign
rights in servants.' 9 '
[I]t was only when indentured servitude (voluntarily under-
taken) finally came to be redefined as involuntary servitude that
the modem concept of free labor could simultaneously emerge
as its mutually contrasting, mutually defining opposite term-
labor that was not subject to legal compulsion in its performance
whether or not it had been voluntarily undertaken in the first
place.' 92
Surprisingly, theories of individualism initially did little to con-
tribute to the concept of free labor. The individualist view, which
regarded wage workers as dependent because they had sold the
right to control their own persons and wills, was compatible with
187. Co-r, supra note 2, at 110-11.
188. STEzriELD, supra note 17, at 53.
189. Id. at 99-100.
190. Id. at 45-47.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 53.
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the tandem view that society was comprised of autonomous indi-
viduals engaged in free transactions for their mutual benefit. 193
Moreover, in the early stages of liberal thought, Locke explained
that every man was by nature free, and poor men consented to
their lower rank in civil society. 194 According to at least one com-
mentator, this early liberal thought was more of a justification for
accumulation of capital than a case for universal rights of self-gov-
ernance. 195 The contradiction within individualism between its ba-
sic tenet that all men were free and had dominion over their
person, and the requirement that laboring men sell the essence of
that liberty-their labor-in order to survive was not apparent un-
til the first four decades of the nineteenth century.1 96 By that time,
"[w]hatever the terms of their employment, whether it was long
term or short term and whether it involved residence with the em-
ployer or not, no adult who was hired to work for another was
considered ... the legal dependent of his or her employer." 97
So the transformation was complete. Whereas formerly only
propertied white men were fully independent, now all non-en-
slaved men, propertied or not, were on the same footing; they all
were autonomous bargaining individuals. In times of labor
shortage, even a laborer could exert power over the wage-labor
relationship with a threat of mobility. This mobility and power
meant that if a man could work, one was free. "'[A]mong workers
who rarely voted and whose other forms of resistance had only lim-
ited effect, mobility may well have emerged as the principal means
of avoiding 'corrupt' dependency on their employers-of asserting
their independence.' ",198
This ideal of free labor was constitutionalized in 1905 in Lochner
v. New York. 199 In that case, the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a New York statute that limited the working hours of all bak-
193. Id. at 80.
194. "[N]o one can be put out of [the state of nature and his right to subsistence],
and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent." LOCKE,
supra note 5, at § 95.
195. MACPHERSON, supra note 18, at 221. Macpherson posits that by his theory of
man's absolute property in his own labor, and his theory of money and unequal distri-
bution of wealth, Locke justified capital accumulation and "erased the moral disabil-
ity with which unlimited capitalist appropriation had hitherto been handicapped." Id.
196. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 155.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 161 (quoting JONATHAN PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER:
TOWN AND FACTORY LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSETTS 1810-1860, at 148 (1983)).
199. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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ers. 20 0 The Court distinguished bakers from underground miners,
for whom, seven years earlier in Holden v. Hardy, it had upheld
working hour restrictions.2 ° ' One of the Court's primary justifica-
tions for its contradictory decisions in these two cases was its view
that the miners in the latter case were different in character from
other workers; they lacked the capacity to protect themselves in
some way and were dependent.2 0 2 Similarly, two years after Loch-
ner, in Muller v. Oregon,2 °3 the Court justified upholding restric-
tions on working hours for female laundry workers because
history discloses that woman has always been dependent upon
man .... [S]he has been looked upon in the courts as needing
especial care that her rights may be preserved. Education was
long denied her, and while now the doors of the school room are
opened and her opportunities for acquiring knowledge are
great, yet even with that and the consequent increase of capacity
for business affairs it is still true that in the struggle for subsis-
tence she is not an equal competitor with her brother. 0 4
She simply lacked sufficient mental and physical capacity to meet
the struggle.
Industrialization not only substantially affected common views
about women's labor and of the kinds of work that constituted in-
dependent labor, but also effected the ascendancy of wage labor
over artisan work.20 5 By the mid-nineteenth century, half of the
American non-enslaved labor force worked for someone else,206
and by 1900, that proportion had risen to three-quarters.20 7 In the
context of industrialization and wage reliance, a growing number
of men would always work for and be under the control of some-
one else.208 To reconcile themselves to this dramatic change,
"white working men . . . redefined independence to mean wage
earning. Using the dualities of independent and dependent in new
ways, they could frame their own labor as independent if it were
contrasted to dependent labor," including slave labor, white home-
200. Id. at 64.
201. 169 U.S. 366 (1898).
202. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 54-55 (1905).
203. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
204. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421-422. The Court so held despite acknowledging that in
Oregon restrictions on the right of women to contract and hold property by then had
been abolished.
205. Cooper, supra note 167, at 834.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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makers, and the non-working poor.2°9 Both in legal and popular
conceptions, the meaning of dependency was recast so that white
male wage work outside the home became the dominant signifier
of independence.
Yet even after the idea of free labor solidified in legal and popu-
lar rhetoric, the concept of wage slavery and its supposition of de-
pendence was used to undermine the premises of autonomy and
independence contained therein. For example, Max Weber argued
that the freedom of workers to enter into labor contracts gained
them little in the way of actual freedom:
The formal right of the worker to enter into any contract what-
soever with any employer whatsoever does not in practice re-
present for the employment seeker even the slightest freedom in
the determination of his own conditions of work, and it does not
guarantee him any influence on this process. It rather means, at
least primarily, that the more powerful party in the market, i.e.,
normally the employer, has the possibility to set the terms, to
offer the job "take it or leave it," and, given the normally press-
ing economic need of the worker, to impose his terms upon him.
The result of contractual freedom, then, is in the first place the
opening of the opportunity to use, by the clever utilization of
property ownership in the market, these resources without legal
restraints as a means for the achievement of power over others
.... In this type of coercion the statement "coactus voluit" [it is
his wish although coerced] applies with peculiar force just be-
cause of the careful avoidance of authoritarian forms. In the
labor market, it is left to the "free" discretion of the parties to
accept the conditions imposed by those who are economically
stronger by virtue of the guaranty of their property ......
The normative preference for work and the favored social status
of wage laborers as independent is further demonstrated by the
place labor holds in the social compact. In contemporary dis-
course, for example, Lawrence Mead focuses on the particular
need, socially and legally, to enforce work in low-skilled, low-paid
"dirty" jobs.21' "[F]or these workers, employment must become a
duty, enforced by public authority, rather than an expression of
self-interest." '12 In addition, Mead concludes, fulfillment of this
209. Id. at 835 (citing DAVID ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS: RACE AND
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 33 (1991)).
210. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 157-158 (quoting MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND
SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 2:729-31 (Guenther Roth &
Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
211. MEAD, supra note 6, at 13.
212. Id. at 69-70.
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obligation "would permit the poor a kind of freedom that govern-
ment benefits alone never can. '2 13 Fulfillment of one's obligations
under the social contract is tied to independence just as it is tied to
work. No matter how society or the individual views the particular
job, work is equated with independence. Moreover, theorists who
focus on self-sufficiency and who seek to relegate dependence to
the private (as opposed to public) domain also invoke the social
contract. Individuals have a socially expected personal obligation
to support privately certain other individuals, namely, their imme-
diate family members.
The interesting aspect of work and labor in dependency rhetoric
is that it is used to support both poles-individualism and social
contract theory. That work is the foundation of the individualist
American dream and at the same time one of the most basic com-
munity-based obligations214 perhaps explains the wide normative
preference for work and for its role as a signifier of moral virtue.
H. DEPENDENCE IN CONTEMPORARY WELFARE
RHETORIC AND REFORM
The legislative history of the recent federal welfare reform, the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996 ("PRWORA"), 2 5 is a contemporary example of how cer-
tain strands of the dependency rhetoric that I have described con-
tinue to have effect. Portions of the House Report introducing the
broad policy goals of the final bill use terms such as dependency,
pathology, self-sufficiency, freedom through work, responsibility
for others, and independence from the state. The Report states:
[T]here is little doubt that the current welfare system is a fail-
ure. It traps recipients in a cycle of dependency. It undermines
the values of work and family that form the foundation of
America's communities. Most devastating of all, it fails the Na-
tion's children.
These are the pathologies that the welfare reform incorpo-
rated in this reconciliation measure is intended to cure.
The reform proposal saves families by promoting work, dis-
couraging illegitimacy, and strengthening child support enforce-
ment. If converts welfare into a helping hand, rather than a
handout, by limiting lifetime welfare benefits. It halts payments
to people who should not be on welfare. It grants maximum
213. Id. at 70.
214. Id. at 242 (discussing the characterization of work as a social obligation).
215. PRWORA, supra note 95.
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State flexibility to show true compassion by helping those in
need achieve the freedom of self-reliance ....
The welfare system contradicts fundamental American values
that ought to be encouraged and rewarded: work, family, per-
sonal responsibility, and self-sufficiency. Instead, the system
subsidizes dysfunctional behavior.
According to a recent Cato Institute study, the total package
of public benefits for low-income persons is, in many cases, sub-
stantially more generous than working. Cato notes that welfare
pays more than the starting salary for a teacher in 9 States ....
As welfare discourages work, it encourages long-term depen-
dency .... 90 percent of those currently receiving welfare will
eventually spend more than 2 years on the rolls, and 76 percent
will receive welfare for more than 5 years. Thus welfare pun-
ishes its intended beneficiaries, isolating them from the eco-
nomic and social mainstream ....
The greatest tragedy of the welfare system is how it harms the
Nation's children. By promoting illegitimacy, the system breeds
a variety of other pathologies scarring children in ways that can
affect their entire lives .... These problems include anti-social
behavior, hyperactivity, disobedience, greater peer conflict, and
dependency.216
Many of the same themes resound in the Republican authored
Contract with America out of which PRWORA grew.217 The Wel-
fare Reform section of the Contract begins:
Isn't it time for the government to encourage work rather than
rewarding dependency? The Great Society has had the unin-
tended consequence of snaring millions of Americans into the
welfare trap. Government programs designed to give a helping
hand to the neediest Americans have instead bred illegitimacy,
crime, illiteracy, and more poverty. Our Contract with America
will change this destructive social behavior by reducing illegiti-
macy, crime, illiteracy, and more poverty. Our Contract with
America will achieve what some thirty years of massive welfare
spending has not been able to accomplish: reduce illegitimacy,
require work, and save taxpayers money. 1 8
It is difficult not to read these documents and feel their persuasive
power. The values that they emphasize are, to a great degree, posi-
tive and uncontroversial ones. And one need only witness the suf-
fering of low-income people in our own cities and countryside to
216. H.R. REP. No. 104-651, at 3-4 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183,
2184-2185.
217. NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1994).
218. Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
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know that there is something terribly wrong. Why, in a land of
abundance, does abject poverty and social isolation remain? The
answer, according to these politicians and policy makers, is depen-
dency. They argue that unstable families, promiscuity, out-of-wed-
lock births, violent crime, illiteracy, anti-social behavior, sloth, and
wasted money all are caused by dependency. These social
problems are then conflated in the law's and the Contract's rhetori-
cal use of that term. This contemporary coda of dependency is the
loss of an individual moral compass, an incapacity to make one's
own way, inappropriate socialization into moral norms, or a re-
peated failure to meet personal responsibilities, and to provide for
oneself and others by working as a wage-laborer.
Even if there is widespread consensus that crime, illiteracy, sloth,
and childbirth outside of marriage should be discouraged, politi-
cians should not use dependency as a simplifying substitute for ac-
tual discussion of these complex social issues. Rather than
confront our shared responsibility for the maintenance of systems
that oppress and contribute to individual desperation, these discur-
sive tactics avoid a discussion of this difficult problem by diverting
focus to the individual alone. Are policy concerns about an indi-
vidual's capacity, morality, and labor-all of which underlie depen-
dency rhetoric-consistent regarding all classes of individuals, or
does the construction of a social problem of dependency encode
other concerns or biases? An example may clarify the answer to
this question. The congressional findings prefacing PRWORA are
almost entirely about the problem of out-of-wedlock births.2 19
Subparagraph (7) of the preface states:
[A]n effective strategy to combat teen pregnancy must [be to]
address the issue of male responsibility, including statutory rape
culpability and prevention. The increase in teen pregnancies
among the youngest girls is particularly severe and linked to
predatory sexual practices by men who are significantly older.220
And yet, except for child support enforcement provisions, there is
little in PRWORA that addresses the predatory sexual practices of
older men, and even those provisions are aimed at providing for
the children ex-post, rather than actually addressing male sexual
practices. Instead, the predominant target of the law remains the
same: young women.221 The repeated goal is the attempt to create
219. PRWORA, supra note 95.
220. Id. § 101(7).
221. The provisions regarding teen mothers focus on requiring the mother to attend
school or job-training programs, and live in an adult-supervised setting. 42 U.S.C.
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incentives that relegate relations of economic dependency to the
private domain.
During the period of initial implementation of the law at the
state level the rhetoric was similar. For example, Rudolph Giu-
liani, the Mayor of New York City, believed that "[f]rom 1960 to
1994, the work ethic was under attack in New York City. '222 The
Mayor further explained that the city "viewed welfare as a good
thing, as a wonderful thing. They romanticized it and embraced a
philosophy of dependency, almost as if it's better to have some-
body on welfare than to help somebody to work." '223 Indeed, "Giu-
liani said he is trying to erase that 'perverted social philosophy'
which robbed the poor of their ambition, and reawaken the respect
for work 'in a deep philosophical and metaphysical sense.'" 224
Giuliani also cited the social contract as underpinning the imple-
mentation of the law. One of his priorities
[wa]s to construct a new social-contract that emphasizes every-
one's obligations to contribute. ("In life, you have to give
back.") ... The contract he seeks is not primarily one between
the government and the poor, he said; "it's also the social con-
tract that people have with each other" through family, friends,
neighborhoods, and churches. "Those are the things that need
to be rebuilt," and the government's main contribution is simply
to get welfare out of the way. "It would be very counterproduc-
tive if government were even a critical part of it," the Mayor
said, referring to the social contract.2 25
Governor Pete Wilson of California was more overt about the
moral failings of the dependent poor when he "[denounced] wel-
fare as a haven for 'idleness and promiscuity'. . . [and proclaimed
§§ 608 (a)(4)-(5). The law also gives states the discretion to impose conditions upon
recipients of aid, including that the recipient remain in school, attend parenting or
money management classes, or otherwise work to obtain skills necessary to collect
child support on behalf of any child for whom aid is sought. Id. § 608 (2). There is
nothing in the law regarding prevention of unwanted pregnancy or requiring state
intervention against "significantly older men" who are guilty of "predatory sexual
practices." PRWORA, § 101(7).
222. Jason DeParle, What Welfare-to-Work Really Means, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec.
20, 1998, at 50 (quoting Mayor Giuliani).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. The author notes the contradiction between the two priorities-cutting
welfare entirely and leaving individuals to the regulation of the market on the one
hand, and providing a public or subsidized job in the heavily interventionist mode of
the Works Progress Administration on the other. Id.
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that t]here's a lot more dignity in any minimum-wage job than sit-
ting on a couch collecting welfare. 22 6
As I have illustrated, however, it is not only cultural and political
conservatives who are concerned about dependency. Libertarians
and liberals also criticize individual and family dependence upon
government benefits. These commentators focus less on the indi-
vidual's responsibility for her dependency than on blaming sys-
temic forces such as capitalism, the contingencies of low-wage
labor markets, demeaning bureaucratic rules, and racism.227 Nev-
ertheless, these commentators advocate self-sufficiency, marriage,
and work as laudable goals, and do so in the vocabulary of depen-
dency. They believe that government should undertake policies to
promote job growth and employment of poor individuals. They be-
lieve, however, that such policies can only be effective if they are
accompanied by higher basic wage levels and diminished racism in
hiring.228 These liberals and libertarians argue that because Afri-
can American workers are often perceived as having "attitudes" or
as being less compliant, they are hired less frequently.22 9 This oc-
curs despite the fact that African American workers may be justifi-
ably dissatisfied with conditions and wage levels.2 3 ° While
acknowledging the existence of work acceptability standards
among many American workers, still other commentators argue
that certain classes of individuals should not be allowed to apply
226. Robert B. Gunnison & Greg Lucas, Wilson Rails Against Aid Recipients, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 8, 1997, at Al.
227. See e.g., Ellen Debenport, Money or Morals for the Poor?, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, Apr. 10, 1995, at 1A; Carl T. Rowan, Racism and Capitalism Fosters Welfare,
HOUSTON CHRON. Feb. 1, 1995, at 20.
228. One anecdote reveals the continuing power of racism in hiring: "Kevin Cun-
ningham was wary about hiring Felicia Fields even at [the subsidized rate of] $1 an
hour. Mr. Cunningham is a gregarious Greenville [Mississippi] insurance agent ....
'This could be stereotyping on my part,' he said, but he worried her friends might say,
'Hey Felicia works up there at Cunningham's office-she knows where the cash
drawer is.' And when Ms. Fields, who is black, arrived for work, Mr. Cunningham,
who is white, said he warned her that 'business language isn't Ebonics."' Jason
DeParle, What About Mississippi?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 1997, at Al; WILLIAM JULIUS
WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR Ch. 5
(1996).
229. DeParle, supra note 228.
230. WILSON, supra note 228. A study directed by Wayne Cornelius, a political sci-
entist at U.C. San Diego discussing immigrant and native-born workers found that
"the American owners of immigrant hiring firms, mostly small businesses-and many
themselves launched by immigrant entrepreneurs-generally consider immigrants to
be harder workers and more reliable than their U.S. counterparts. Native-born work-
ers, the employers said, typically did not last long in jobs that were often low-paid,
without benefits or chance of advancement." Patrick J. McDonnell, Jobs Exist for
Immigrants, Study Finds Labor, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 1998, at B1.
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those standards to their work situations.231 And at least some
lawmakers believe that workfare participants should not be enti-
tled to the same workplace protections as other workers.232
Whatever the party affiliation of the commentators, the four
strands of dependency rhetoric that I have described are readily
apparent in current welfare rhetoric and reform. Unlike other cash
benefits programs such as unemployment insurance and social se-
curity, which each use an individual's tie to the labor market as a
determinant of eligibility and benefit level, public welfare pro-
grams and their recipients suffer seriously as a result of this rheto-
ric. The question remains, however, whether the categorizations of
dependent and independent that are fostered by this rhetoric are
theoretically valid.
III. THE DIALECTIC OF DEPENDENCE AND INDEPENDENCE
I have identified capacity, individual morality and behavior, a
relationship with the state, and work and property ownership as
four ways in which dependence has been used to distinguish and
mark people as subordinate. I also have established that echoes of
these four ways of marking dependent status still influence and en-
code current welfare debate and reform. In this section I focus
more directly upon the meaning of dependence and independence
in these categorizations: its character and content. How are the
categories used by these commentators, legal theorists, social phi-
losophers, and policy makers, and to what effect? What are the
contradictions within and among these categories? I make no at-
tempt at an empirical study of the "causes of dependency." Instead
my concern is the implications of the categories as they are used; is
there any coherence to the invocation of the term dependency?
From my descriptions of the four specific themes and the histori-
cal transformation of classes it should be clear that the term "de-
pendent" has had many meanings both in legal and political
rhetoric as well as within individual relationships. This mutable
meaning is constructed by social, theoretical, economic, and experi-
ential forces. By using the term in her discussion or rhetoric, a
given commentator, politician, or judge may be invoking one or
several of these meanings. Moreover, depending on her end, she
231. "[F]or these workers, employment must become a duty, enforced by public
authority, rather than an expression of self-interest." MEAD, supra note 6, at 13.
232. Robert Pear, G.O.P in House Moves to Bar Minimum Wage for Workfare,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1997, at B16.
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may be appealing to one or several of the implications and ideolo-
gies embodied by these themes.
Whatever theme is invoked, the state in which a dependent per-
son exists justifies her subjugation to the will of another individual,
entity, or ideal. If the dependent lacks full capacity to exert her
free will in her own best interest, she is subject to the control of
another individual or to that of the state. If she has the capacity to
make such decisions but has forfeited that power through her own
lack of judgment, weak morality, or deviant behavior, she is either
subject to state control, or is left to fend for herself until she con-
forms her behavior and obtains the natural benefits of that con-
formity. If she relies upon the state for economic support or
ignores her responsibilities to provide for herself and her depen-
dents through lack of personal productivity, she may be expected
to relinquish some of her individual rights or be required to follow
strict rules determined by the state. In short, the determination of
who is a dependent individual does not rest merely in the fact that
dependent individuals are legally or socially subject to the will of
another, but in the need that society has to control such individuals
because of their behavior or status. Each of these descriptions of
dependence confers a socially constructed status upon a person and
justifies social or state regulation of that individual; because they
are dependents, they must be allowed fewer rights and freedoms.
Conversely, to be categorized as independent, foremost, an indi-
vidual must not be subject to regulation because of incapacity; she
must be a full member of the polity with all rights of self-govern-
ance. Secondly, an individual must own substantial private prop-
erty, must have an entitlement that allows her to exercise
autonomy, or must freely labor. An independent individual is a
self-regarding person who is "[invulnerable] to the wants and needs
of others and [does] not [have] to depend on their good will or
solidarity, '2 33 or the good will of the state. In addition, to be fully
independent the individual must recognize the social compact of
which she is a part, and conform her behavior to prevailing
norms.2 31 Independence means being a healthy, working, or
wealthy adult who conforms her public behavior to acceptable so-
cial expectations, but who also has a space, property, in which she
may act in non-conforming ways. 235
233. Simon, supra note 38, at 1433.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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A. The Changing Determinations of Capacity and Morality
The question of whom we trust to participate in both public and
private sphere decisionmaking is one about governance and self-
governance. Which classes of people are or should be governed by
others in their daily lives? Which classes may to some extent gov-
ern themselves and their own destinies? Which classes may partici-
pate in the public polity? Which are denied a voice in the
community? The answers to these questions have, of course,
changed over time. One obvious example, the history of the allo-
cation of the right to vote, reveals how much conceptions of who
may govern in the community have changed.
As early as colonial times the vote was allocated only to a lim-
ited number of individuals, i.e., white male property owners.236 As
I have noted, men without property, although recognized as inde-
pendent legal entities in the community, did not enjoy full rights of
self-governance or participation.237 Significantly, for hundreds of
years, married women existed in a state of legal coverture, a status
which put them, their property, their wages, their individual and
community voice, and the enforcement of their rights under the
control of their husbands.238 Only male heads of household were
trusted to voice the concerns of their household members in soci-
ety, just as male legislators were trusted to legislate on their be-
half.239 When female activists began asserting the claim that men
were failing adequately to protect the rights of women and fami-
lies-the female sphere-they couched this claim in terms of gov-
ernance. 24 ° No longer was dependent status beneficial to woman
and society, for men were not fulfilling their representative
obligations.
236. See generally Cott, supra note 23.
237. Supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
238. Cott, supra note 23, at 1451-53.
239. Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights,
Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution 1820-1878, 74 J. Am. HIST. 836,
842, 849 (1987). For example, suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton clearly invoked wo-
man's difference from man and her need for protection from him in the political and
law-making arena. Stanton "believed that 'the care and protection' that men give wo-
men was 'such as the wolf gives the lamb, the eagle the hare he carries to the eyrie!!"'
Id. at 842 (citation omitted).
240. The Declaration of Sentiments set forth at the Seneca Falls Convention was
explicit in its invocation of liberty and self-governance; it was written in parallel form
to the Declaration of Independence. THE CONCISE HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE:
SELECTIONS FROM THE CLASSIC WORK OF STANTON, ANTHONY, GAGE AND HARPER
(Mari Jo Buhle & Paul Buhle eds., 1979).
716
2001] THEORY AND DISCOURSE OF DEPENDENCE 717
Similarly, African Americans' fight for full access to the
franchise lasted for almost a century, and involved battling poll
taxes, literacy requirements, and other tests.2 41 Even today, some
groups are excluded from exercising the right to vote, and politi-
cians and localities are engaged in maneuvers that will affect ballot
access, effect, and distribution. 4 z In many states, prisoners are
prohibited from voting, and in at least some states, convicted felons
have the same limitation.243 Given the large numbers of non-white
men who are incarcerated or have such convictions, this prohibi-
tion may have the effect of limiting the political voice of those men
and their communities. Moreover, even the most accepted basis
for distributing the vote-citizenship, a status that seems so con-
crete-has been manipulated over time.244 For example, until the
nineteenth amendment was passed, the right to vote was denied to
white native-born women despite their undeniable status as citi-
zens, and various limitations based upon racial identity and birth
country have moved in and out of vogue according to popular
sentiments.245
Of course, not all questions of governance and capacity reside in
the right to vote. Some individuals who may be endowed with the
right to vote may yet be constrained or controlled in their actions
in other ways by the state or other individuals. This is true for
welfare recipients. Although these recipients may have the right to
vote, they and their children are under the strict control of the gov-
ernment. The rhetoric employed to increase the level of such con-
241. See e.g., Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 663 (1966)
(invalidating poll taxes as unconstitutional and "inconsistent with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause"); Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Electors, 360 U.S. 45, 45
(1959) (finding constitutional literacy requirement as prerequisite to voter registra-
tion); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 330, 348 (1972) (outlawing one-year residency
requirement for voting as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, but approving
thirty-day requirement for administrative purposes). The Voting Rights Act of 1965
also stated that:
No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision
in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1994).
242. There were and are great political struggles around such measures as the "Mo-
tor Voter" law that provided voter registration at local driver's licensing agency of-
fices, Congressional redistricting, and methods for census taking.
243. Supra note 51.
244. See generally Cott, supra note 23.
245. Id. Cott describes extensive regulations that both excluded foreign-born
Asians from ever attaining U.S. citizenship, and penalized native born women who
married such foreign-born men.
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trol includes invocations of dependency and the individual's
inability to self-govern; 246 these women simply cannot be trusted to
govern themselves or their children. Because the system provides
no individualized determination of whether a woman has met ex-
pected social norms, the fact that she must rely upon welfare is
sufficient justification for the state to require her to document her
compliance with a wide array of social responsibilities. In addition,
she is subject to economic sanction if she fails either in that docu-
mentation or in the substantive requirements.
In contrast, commentators and policy makers do not draw the
same conclusions about individuals who are not on welfare. The
state cares only to a limited extent whether or not non-recipients
conform to social norms.247 For example, unlike recipients who are
subject to "learnfare" rules,248 wealthy individuals whose children
do not attend school regularly are not economically penalized. 49
Nor are such individuals economically punished if they remain un-
married, if they have a child outside marriage, or if they do not
work. A similar point was raised by proponents of "mother's aid,"
a program of state assistance aimed at compensating women for
the unpaid labor they performed in raising their children.25 ' For
example, Socialist William Hard "liked to describe mothers as 'em-
ployes' (sic) of the community. He opposed conditioning such re-
lief by supervision of recipients: if the state was concerned with
inadequate mothering, he insisted, let it supervise all mothers, in-
cluding those with husbands, the wealthy as well as the poor. "251
A contemporary example of this differential treatment was the
Clinton Administration's proposed tax credit for non-working
spouses.252 This proposal allows stay-at-home parents to deduct a
certain amount of money from their tax returns; in essence, they
246. See supra Section II; MOHL, supra note 12, at 39.
247. As more states adopt general and particular parental liability statutes, this may
be changing.
248. Learnfare programs penalize the family by cutting the family's aid if a recipi-
ent child is absent from school for more than a given number of school days. MEAD,
THE NEW PATERNALISM, supra note 91, at 44; Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of
Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 726-
735 (1992).
249. MEAD, supra note 91.
250. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE His-
TORY OF WELFARE 56-57 (1994).
251. Id. at 57.
252. Similar measures have been proposed in state legislatures. Senate OKs $100
Tax Credit for Stay-at-Home Mothers, DESERET NEWS, Feb. 25, 1999, (Statement of
Sen. Robert Muhlstein, R- Mapleton) ("In a very small way, we are saying the state
cares that (mothers) take care of their children and stay at home.").
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are allowed a cash subsidy. But the proposal does not discuss the
moral virtue or parenting ability of these parents; the tax credit is
not withdrawn if the child misses too much school, or if the parent
is a teenager. It only requires that the parent be married. The pol-
icy goal in this case is not to move individuals (women) from rely-
ing on tax credits to working, or from economic dependency on tax
credits and male breadwinners to self-sufficiency; the policymakers
who support this measure do not expect or even desire that the
parents who would claim this credit will work. Rather, in the lan-
guage of rational choice behavior, the state is providing a public
monetary incentive for women to remain in a relation of private
economic dependency-marriage.253
The social and legal rhetoric and categorizations about who
should govern and who should be governed, have therefore, at one
and the same time been over- and under-inclusive; they make no
attempt to distinguish among individuals or to provide for real de-
terminations about individual capacity or morality. The moral and
capacity justifications for regulation, in fact, may amount to un-
stated rhetorical proxies for class and racial biases.
There are similar problems of over- and under-inclusiveness in
the highly charged debate about whether minor children should be
allowed to make claims on their own behalf or against their par-
ents. Should it depend upon their maturity and judgment? Can
children be trusted to make certain important life decisions despite
their dependent status?254 If they are allowed this measure of self-
253. The amount of money actually saved by this tax credit likely would be very
small for a given family and is unlikely to provide a true incentive. Charles Murray,
The Perils of GOP Activism, WALL ST. J., Feb. 20, 1998, at A18 (according to Murray,
a "tax credit of a few thousand dollars for stay-at-home moms will affect the behavior
of mothers who (1) have a substantial source of income other than their own earnings,
(2) have a tax bill large enough to take advantage of the credit, (3) prefer to stay
home with their children, (4) aren't willing to forgo 100% of their income to do so,
but (5) are willing to forego 80% or 90% of their income to do so. Almost all of the
forgone government revenue for the stay-at-home tax credit will go to mothers who
were going to stay home with their children anyway"); Stephanie Armour, Should
parents who stay home get tax breaks?, USA TODAY, Apr. 15, 1998 at 8B. The propo-
sal and others like it in reality provide a strong symbolic, class-based counterpoint to
the ceaseless rhetoric railing against provision of unconditional cash assistance to
poor women; Apple Pie Vote, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 1998 (reporting on U.S.
House of Representatives unanimous vote supporting a resolution that "applauds"
parents who stay at home with the kids instead of going off to work).
254. E.g., In re Long Island Jewish Med. Ctr., 557 N.Y.S.2d 239 (1990) (finding that
the court must act parens patriae where a minor patient petitions court to withhold
lifesaving medical treatment because even if the "mature minor" doctrine did apply in
New York, this minor child of seventeen plus years held an insufficiently mature un-
derstanding of his own religious beliefs or of the fatal consequences to himself); In re
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governance, should they be able to assert claims against their par-
ents? Similarly, when it comes to criminal responsibility, many
commentators and legislatures argue that minors as young as
twelve and fourteen should be held to adult standards of maturity
of thought and judgment. 5  One result is the continued lowering
of the age at which juveniles must be prosecuted as if they were
adults.25 6 This in turn eliminates the possibility of individualized
determinations about whether these children have actually
achieved the independence and awareness of mind described by
Locke and that ensures that they have a knowledge of the law and
its consequences.
Furthermore, large-scale institutionalization of mentally ill and
mentally retarded people has been discontinued as social norms
about capacity have changed and society has come to believe that
many of these individuals can achieve a measure of autonomy and
self-sufficiency.257 Indeed, legal mechanisms such as the Individu-
E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1989) (discussing the case law on age and fact of capacity
that shows "that no 'bright line' age restriction of eighteen is tenable in restricting the
rights of mature minors, whether the rights be based on constitutional or other
grounds[,]" and holding that a court may, by clear and convincing evidence, adjudi-
cate a minor as "mature," and such a minor has a limited right to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment.); Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739 (Tenn. 1987) (mature minor
has the common law capacity to consent to or decline medical procedures).
255. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Deconstructing the Myth of "Infancy Law Doctrine":
From Incapacity to Accountability, 21 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 481 (1994); Abraham
Abramovsky, Trying Juveniles as Adults, N.Y. L.J., June 8, 1998, at 219; Victoria Slind-
Flor, Pressure to Give Juries to Juvies Tried as Adults: More Juveniles Are Getting
Pushed into Adult Courts, But Without All the Rights, 20 NAT'L L.J. Oct. 6, 1997 at
A6; M.A. Stapleton, Priorities Wrong in Federal Get-Tough Approach to Youth Crime,
CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 13, 1997 at 1.
256. MASS. GEN. L. ANNOTATED ch. 119, §§ 52, 58 (1993), as amended 1996 and
1998, and 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1985).
257. For example, the Congressional findings that prompted revisions to the Educa-
tion for All Handicapped Children Act included the following statement:
Disability is a natural part of the human experience and in no way dimin-
ishes the right of individuals to participate in or contribute to society. Im-
proving educational results for children with disabilities is an essential
element of our national policy of ensuring equality of opportunity, full par-
ticipation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for individuals
with disabilities.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(1) (1990).
Similarly, the Congressional findings prefacing the Americans with Disabilities Act
include findings regarding the isolation and dependency of disabled persons, and an
aspiration to change those conditions. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(9) (1994).
"[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabili-
ties, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem." Id.§ 12101(a)(2). Further, "individuals with disabilities are a discrete an insular minority
who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a history of pur-
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als with Disabilities Education Act 25 8 and the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act2 59 specifically aim to increase the autonomy of
mentally and physically disabled persons who once were classified
as dependents by integrating them into as many sectors of society
as possible.
Whether a person is determined to have the capacity to act ei-
ther in his own behalf or as a political actor changes in accordance
with social and legal norms. As our social norms of governance
and self-governance have changed, so has the discourse of depen-
dence. Even now, questions of capacity remain controversial and
centrally tied to the rhetoric of dependency. Although the rhetoric
implies a set meaning for capacity and morality, the reality is that
these conceptions have an evolving life of their own.
B. Conformity and Autonomy
Although my focus has been on describing dependence rhetoric,
I do not want to omit independence, commonly invoked as an op-
posite and ideal state, from my discussion. As I have described
dependence rhetoric, I also have provided alternative meanings to
independence. For example, "independence" can be maturity of
judgment, morality of character, or a manner of conduct. In the
last of these meanings, "independence" has been used by different
commentators to mean deeply contradictory things. These compet-
ing visions are the essence of the struggle between individual lib-
erty and state power. They are part of the "fundamental
contradiction" of American legal theory that I described earlier. 6 °
The concept of individual independence as I have described it
from Reich's position, is probably familiar to most of us: the ability
of a person to act in non-conforming ways without interference by
the state. This kind of independence is about the freedom to disa-
gree, to pursue alternative lifestyles, to own a vast array of weap-
ons, to do what we want in our own homes, to wear our hair the
way we like, to say outrageous things, to read pornography, to
teach our children at home, and to do what we want with our prop-
erty-whether that means hanging our laundry in front of our
poseful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in
our society." Id. § 12101(a)(7). Therefore, "the Nation's proper goals regarding indi-
viduals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation, inde-
pendent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals ..... Id.
§ 12101(a)(8).
258. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1994).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1994).
260. Singer, supra note 3, at 980; Kennedy, supra note 3, at 211.
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homes or developing our land. As I have said, however, Reich's
theory is not strictly libertarian.261 It does not espouse complete
elimination of state regulation of individual relationships. Reich
recognizes inequality of right and instead advocates for increased
protection of individual freedom by expanding definitions of prop-
erty, i.e., the locales in which these freedoms can be pursued.2 62
Nevertheless, Reich's vision is a plural one that puts primacy on
individual rights at the expense of community rights; it is located at
the individualist pole. In the welfare context, for example, it claims
that the same paternalist policies whose goals are to minimize de-
pendency in fact cause it.263 If an individual is subject to constant
scrutiny and regimentation, if she is treated as if she were incapa-
ble of rational decisionmaking, if she must sacrifice her individual
preferences and protections to survive, then she will become a de-
pendent. This idea is not far removed from the original preference
in the U.S. welfare system for cash over in-kind assistance or lim-
ited vouchers.264 In a free market system, it is always better to
have each individual rank his own preferences, and spend his
money accordingly. Giving individuals cash over in-kind assistance
promotes this goal and, at least in a limited way, fosters the individ-
ual's sense of independence. 265
The [Social Security Act] affirmed the dignity and responsibility
of recipients by specifying that aid was to be given in the form of
money, which the receiver was free to spend as he or she
deemed best, rather than as aid in kind, such as orders for gro-
ceries or fuel, which too often reflected condescension and un-
warranted suspicion in past relief administrations.266
The true individualist has a similar vision of independence, al-
though she accepts inequality as inevitable. Such an individualist
might argue that:
There are few presumptions in human relations more dangerous
than the idea that one knows what another human being needs
better than they do themselves. In politics, this presumption is a
warrant to ignore democratic preferences and to trample on
freedom. In other realms too, the arrogation of the right by...
261. See generally Reich, supra note 13.
262. Id. at 787.
263. Id. at 758.
264. See CAROLYN SHAW BELL, THE ECONOMICS OF THE GHETTO 153-56 (1970).
265. Id.
266. Id. at 154 (quoting Wilbur J. Cohen, Social Security Objectives and Achieve-
ments, Soc. SECURITY BULL. 2 (Aug. 1995)).
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social workers to administer the needs of their clients ... is in
each case a warrant for abuse.267
In the struggle between individual liberty and state power these
visions privilege individual autonomy. The state's role should be
very limited as should the community's claim on the individual.268
In contrast, paternalists such as Lawrence Mead and Mary Jo
Bane reside at the opposite pole embodied by social contract the-
ory.269 They focus on the conformity that is necessary to achieve
individual independence. This is not to say that such paternalists
believe that there should be no realm, not even within one's own
private property, in which individuals should be able to act as they
wish. Nor is it to say that they agree upon what the values are that
should be fostered, or the rules that should be imposed to change
behavior. Rather, paternalists center their theory and policies on
the obligations of independent people rather than their rights.2 70 It
is in this respect that paternalists are aligned with social contract
theorists. Paternalists seek to identify the obligations of the social
contract and enforce them against non-conforming members of the
community.271 This dimension of independence is about the free-
dom that comes with predictability of result, fulfillment of expecta-
tion, and responsibility.272 Freedom is achieved by giving up
certain rights of non-conformity in service to the greater good.273
This is the strain of independence that, in the struggle between
freedom and security, or individual liberty and state power,274 is
aligned with the latter-the community's interests.
Interestingly, in this vision of obligation, the individual has a
claim upon the community just as the community has one on the
individual. The community does not deny that it is obliged to care
267. GORDON, supra note 250, at 164 (quoting MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS
OF STRANGERS 11 (1985)).
268. Id.
269. By calling both Lawrence Mead and Mary Jo Bane paternalists, I do not mean
to imply the complete similarity of their underlying political ideologies or policy phi-
losophies. I do, however, understand each of their policy positions to begin with
premises of social contract theory and to include substantial government conditions
on the actions of recipients of public aid. In contrast to Mead, Bane and Ellwood also
seek to change the institutional culture of the welfare delivery system itself. Thus, the
obligations of the social contract fall not only on the recipients of aid, but also on the
caseworkers (the government), so that the workings of the system itself promotes
dignity and respect. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
270. MEAD, supra note 6, at 246-49.
271. Id. at 246.
272. Id. at 256-58.
273. Id.
274. Singer, supra note 3, at 980.
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for its poor or weak members, it simply asserts its own prerogatives
to name the conditions of its aid. 75 The paternalist would justify
this as did Locke, to ensure the survival of the community, and that
bastion of individual freedom, property. Failure to enforce this so-
cial compact could lead to anarchy. As one commentator noted
during the Depression:
Want and fear became the base for a progressive curtailment of
man's freedom. Today, as repeatedly throughout history, this
basic want and fear have engendered hostile feelings which, in
turn, have pitted man against man and prompted him to use his
scientific enlightenment in that wholesale destruction of life and
property which now threatens not only the realization of his so-
cial goals but also his very survival.276
These complex and contradictory visions, by their very existence
create problems for the rhetoric of dependence. How far and in
which direction should we go in our struggle between freedom and
security? If we chose to err on the side of security, how do we
determine the content of the social compact? If we favor individu-
alism, how much non-conformity should we tolerate? These ques-
tions raise a basic consideration for individuals who use
dependency rhetoric in an attempt to shape welfare policy: how can
an intellectually honest debate use the rhetoric of dependence and
independence when these terms each are used by different com-
mentators and policymakers to justify such a continuum of goals-
abolition of welfare; generous welfare entitlements; or welfare con-
ditioned on a wide variety of behavioral and work requirements?
C. The Meaning of Work
As I have described already, a predominant focus of dependency
rhetoric is the liberal theoretical emphasis on work as a means to
liberation. But conceptions of labor have undergone dramatic
transformations over the last three centuries, and even today, the
direct correlation between labor and freedom is suspect. While la-
bor may be a means to individual freedom, it is by no means clear,
even in contemporary American society, that the two are always
causally connected. The mutable political, social, and economic
meanings of "dependence" and "independence" throw doubt on
the certainty of any one specific meaning. Historically and cur-
275. MEAD, supra note 6, at 4.
276. GORDON, supra note 250, at 163 (quoting CHARLOTTE TOWLE, Soc. SEC. BD.,
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE REPORT No. 8, COMMON HUMAN NEEDS: AN INTERPRETATION
FOR STAFF IN PUBLIC ASSISTANCE AGENCIES 1-2 (1945)).
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rently, working people are no less theoretically dependent than
their non-working counterparts. Furthermore, the fact that an in-
dividual does not work does not necessarily mean that she is de-
pendent according to legal and political rhetoric.
As stated, up until the late eighteenth century only propertied
individuals enjoyed the rights and benefits of fully independent cit-
* 277izens. They were subject only to limited regulation and were ex-
pected to provide certain benefits for individuals under their care
and in their employ.278 Propertyless individuals-the poor-on the
other hand, were subject to detailed regulation of their work
lives.2 79 These propertyless individuals were commanded to work
and were subject to criminal and corporal penalties for failure to
meet conditions set by both their master and the law. They had no
capacity to act as independent men. Only in the nineteenth cen-
tury was the modern idea of free labor recognized in American
law.28° "In the eye of the law, [laborer and employer were] both
freemen-citizens having equal rights, and brethren having one
common destiny."2 81
Clearly, both legal and social conceptions of laborers as a depen-
dent class have changed over time based on social, economic, polit-
ical, and theoretical norms and conditions. This dramatic historical
change in popular and legal conception shows that the content of
"dependent" is fluid. Indeed, even after the idea of free labor as
waged-work performed outside the home by white men was solidi-
fied in legal and popular rhetoric, the concept of dependence in the
idea of wage-slavery was in turn used to undermine the premises of
freedom contained in the free labor concept. Similarly, in modern
times, whether an individual might accurately be characterized as
independent because of his status as a wage-worker, could vary
under the circumstances. Is a mentally retarded grocery bagger, or
child ice cream scooper independent? Even if they may have a
measure of physical autonomy, individually earn economic sup-
port, or have a subjective feeling of independence as a result of
their work, the fact that they work is likely insufficient for society
to endow them with such a label. In these cases, the individual's
capacity is a more important signifier when determining indepen-
dence. Of course, it depends upon which usage of dependence we
277. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 4-6; Cott, supra note 23, at 1448.
278. STEINFELD, supra note 17, at 154.
279. See generally id.
280. Id. at 15.
281. Id.
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invoke. These individuals may at the same time be both indepen-
dent and dependent.
In fact, as the above examples illustrate, these apparently contra-
dictory terms could each be applied to the same individual, or
could be applied each to different individuals engaged in the same
work. To one individual, wage-work might mean freedom. It
might give an individual emotional and intellectual fulfillment by
virtue of the tasks that she performs, and it might also give her
material fulfillment by virtue of the wages she earns. Moreover, it
might give her the stability she seeks through a promise of job se-
curity. It might give her a sense of dignity and self-reliance, and
status in her community. Such feelings of self-fulfillment, however,
would depend upon how she defines independence for herself.
Similarly, the status that society attached to this individual as a
worker might change depending on current social, political, and le-
gal norms. For example, in the eighteenth century she would have
been considered a dependent, whereas, one hundred years later
she would have the status of independent.
Work, of course, may not always lead to independence either lit-
erally or theoretically. An individual's paid labor might be routin-
ized and intellectually unstimulating, or isolating and demeaning.
It might require her to work long or erratic hours that preclude
pursuit of greater opportunities for recreation, a rich family life,
community involvement, or education. It might be so poorly paid
that it provides neither the subsistence necessary to support a fam-
ily, nor avenues for advancement or skill development. It might be
contingent or part-time and be subject to many rules and regula-
tions such as limitations on speech, choice of dress and hairstyle,
smoking habits, or personal relationships. Again, however,
whether these working conditions constituted freedom or depen-
dence would vary with common norms and the circumstances of
the worker. For example, the same part-time work could imbue a
sense of independence in an individual who values flexibility in
personal scheduling, while it could create a feeling of dependence
in another individual who finds that the unpredictability of the job
limits her ability to order her life or maintain a reliable source of
income. Similarly, regularized work might be freeing to a person
who seeks employment that minimizes stress, allows predictability,
or is work that she can easily escape when she is not at the office.
Moreover, the subjectivity and social construction of the rela-
tionship between independence and work is not reserved for
poorly-paid workers. Even highly paid workers might feel aliena-
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tion from the workplace and dependent on and at the whim of
their employer. Highly paid manufacturing workers for example,
are becoming more contingent due to the globalization of the in-
dustrial marketplace. 8 2 In the legal profession, attorneys routinely
report a sense of being trapped in a profession that values billing
over creativity and combativeness over conciliation. Furthermore,
many highly paid older workers say that they feel at risk for fear of
losing their jobs to more technology savvy but less mature and ex-
perienced college recruits. At all wage levels, regardless of an indi-
vidual's sense of freedom about the situation, market forces
include the omnipresent reality of the possibility of being replaced
by another cheaper or more efficient worker. This threat of re-
placement makes it more likely that each worker will opt for the
security of remaining with a job, even if it means subjecting himself
to the will of the employer rather than pursuing his ideal of inde-
pendent labor.283
An individualist might argue that the individual's choice to re-
main in a job that does not fulfill his ideal of independence is, in
fact, his exercise of free choice and serves to prove that the value
of freedom is secured. This argument, however, resembles the sev-
enteenth century argument, ultimately rejected by liberal theory,
that the indentured servant's freedom was evidenced by her volun-
tarily entering into the agreement. Of course, that there is neither
legal compulsion nor criminal penalty forcing an individual to enter
into a modern labor contract distinguishes it from the seventeenth
century example. What is present in the modern case, however, is
individuals' economic dependence upon the pressures and vagaries
of market forces for their sustenance.
Historical evidence that the content of the meaning of indepen-
dent labor has changed, and the clear contradictions within the the-
ories and realities of modern wage labor show that a person who
has engaged in lifelong work is by no means certainly able to claim
to have led an independent life. There may be norms that we as a
society prefer, that justify and drive us to make the work equals
dependence equation in legal and political rhetoric. But it is noth-
ing more than that: a normative preference, albeit probably a good
one, that we seek to advance through social policy, legal rules, and
political discourse.
282. John R. Reinert, What is America Doing to its Free Labor Market?, SAN DI-
EGO UNION-TRIB., Sept. 24, 1998 at B9.
283. G0STA ESPING-ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM
109 (1990).
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As much as the claim that a life of work inherently leads to a life
of independence fails, so too does the related claim that a life with-
out waged-work is equal to a life of dependency. For example, in-
dividuals who are "independently wealthy" and who do not work
could be viewed as either dependent or independent. The term
"independently wealthy" with all its connotations, itself contradicts
the claim that work is necessary for independence. One view of
independence actually seems to be not having to work-being
wealthy without working. And so it has been for centuries.
What is it that makes the wealthy independent? It cannot be the
dignity that is associated with work. If it were the fact of work
alone that determined one's independence, then individuals with
inherited wealth sufficient for their economic support would be
commanded to work or be as stigmatized and unhealthy as the wo-
man on welfare. Consider the following two individuals: 1) a
young, single, independently wealthy woman who engages in no
productive work; and 2) a young, single, poor woman who receives
welfare and who is engaged in the productive work of raising her
child. Why is it that the second woman is the dependent one? Is it
that she relies upon the state for her subsistence? Is it that she is
not living up to her obligations, either to her children or to society,
to earn her and their keep? Is it that she is unmarried, weak, or
deviant? Certainly, any or all of these could easily be invoked
against her in the form of dependency rhetoric. But both the wo-
men are in the same position in relation to wage-work-they are
not doing it. What is the obvious difference between these wo-
men? It seems to be property. So is it property rather than work
that leads to independence? Reich certainly believed it to be so.
Property and wealth are about dominion and control, depen-
dence for the controlled and independence for the controller.
Property law regulates not relations "between an owner and a
thing, but between the owner and other individuals in reference to
things. 2 8 4 Property rights allow an individual to
exclude others from using the things which [the law] assigns to
[him]. If then somebody else wants to use the food, the house,
the land, or the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my
consent. To the extent that these things are necessary to the life
of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me a power, limited but
real, to make him do what I want.285
284. Morris Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 12 (1927).
285. Id.
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This idea of domination and control inherent in property law is
transported into the wage relationship through the employer's le-
gal proprietary entitlement to the product of her employee's labor.
As Morris Cohen so eloquently described it over seventy years ago:
The character of property as sovereign power compelling ser-
vice and obedience may be obscured for us in a commercial
economy by the fiction of the so-called labor contract as a free
bargain and by the frequency with which service is rendered in-
directly through a money payment. But not only is there actu-
ally little freedom to bargain on the part of the steel worker or
miner who needs a job, but in some cases the medieval subject
had as much power to bargain when he accepted the sovereignty
of his lord. Today I do not directly serve my landlord if I wish to
live in the city with a roof over my head, but I must work for
others to pay him rent with which he obtains the personal ser-
vices of others. The money needed for purchasing things must
for the vast majority be acquired by hard labor and disagreeable
service to those to whom the law has accorded dominion over
the things necessary for subsistence.
To a philosopher this is of course not at all an argument
against private property. It may well be that compulsion in the
economic as well as the political realm is necessary for civilized
life. But we must not overlook the actual fact that dominion
over things is also imperium over our fellow human beings.286
Cohen uses the words dominion, compulsion, power, and impe-
rium. The images he evokes are the dependent and independent,
the ability of the independent person to "exclude others from their
necessities, and thus to compel them to serve him" in labor.287 In
this view, it is the ownership of property and accumulated wealth,
no matter how it is obtained, not the act of working that produces
independence. And it is a person's lack of wealth or property and
his need to labor for his subsistence that makes him dependent.
But have we entered a tautology? Does this argument take the
issue too far? The liberal basis for property is work. If one works,
one can accumulate wealth, and once one accumulates wealth one
is independent; thus work does signify independence. The answer
to this is that it assumes an equality in the distribution of property
and wealth. It assumes that the background rules of economic en-
titlement operate in a neutral way. But that simply is not reality.
Even in the nascent liberal theory of John Locke, there was no
286. Id. at 12-13.
287. Id. at 18.
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equality of property or equality of right. Rather, differences be-
tween men rich in property and those poor existed in the state of
nature. Accumulation of wealth beyond one's ability to consume
was simply justified as natural,288 as if the mere existence of private
property necessarily and inherently defined the contours of the
rights and duties accompanying its existence. That this natural
right ultimately might come into conflict with the right of another
man to subsistence never entered the equation.
As Locke asserted, "it [was] plain, that men have agreed [by use
of money] to disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth,
they having by a tacit and voluntary consent found out a way, how
a man may fairly possess more land than he himself can use the
product of .... ",289 But it is just as plain that natural law state-
ments such as these are built upon uncritical assumptions about the
neutrality of the background rules of economic entitlement. True
observations about the actual operation of social and legal rules of
economic entitlement does not mean that they are necessary or in-
evitable; because they are, does not mean that they must be.
[T]he substantive content and distributive effects of the range of
legal entitlements are not matters of indifference, rather they
reflect and enact distinct political values. Legal entitlements do
not descend from the sky, but are created by human actors who
make moral or philosophical decisions, explicitly or implicitly,
about who is deserving or undeserving of reward within a given
economic structure .... Thus the legal entitlements that form
the basis of private property allocations and contractual rights
are not natural or neutral but chosen, and they play a significant
role in determining the prevailing distribution of wealth and in-
come, favoring certain interests and disfavoring others.29 °
These rules of economic entitlement determine who may accumu-
late wealth and in what manner; they determine who is free and
who is dependent in the legal and economic culture. The argument
that these rules ensure greater freedom for all citizens by re-
warding entrepreneurship and greater productivity goes only so far
as arguing that such rules should be normatively preferred.
Changing the rules to allow for more redistribution of property
might lower productivity somewhat, but it might also alleviate the
degrading conditions in which the working poor labor, thereby in-
creasing their autonomy-a trade-off that might itself be norma-
288. LOCKE, supra note 5, § 46.
289. Id. § 50.
290. Williams, supra note 136; Handler, supra note 92, at 926-27.
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tively preferred. Indeed, Charles Reich was-on this track when he
argued for redefining the meaning of property. But change would
have to be more fundamental than Reich's vision. As William Si-
mon argues, expanding the categories of property that could be
called entitlements fails to address redistributive concerns.2 9'
Reich's theory remains rooted in the same framework he criticizes;
instead of redistributing wealth, expanding property rights to cover
new forms of wealth only sublimates redistributive goals from the
discussion. As Simon says, "[I]f all forms of 'economic status' were
to be turned into entitlements, there could be no subsequent distri-
bution[, for in] Reich's analysis, as in classicism, the idea of right
serves as a defense against redistribution. 2 92 There would simply
be more forms of wealth that the government could not
redistribute.
What is necessary is an actual substantive change in the content
of the rules, not a change in what the rules protect. Thus, it might
entail changing the entitlement that employers own the entire
product of labor, that individuals control the distribution of their
estate at death, or changing property rights so that they include
only the rights of use and enjoyment nor rights of alienation.
D. Ways of Being Dependent on the State
The preceding discussion about the role of property in defining
independence raises a second point about the role that the state
plays in maintaining the status of propertied persons. It is the state
that creates a zone of personal autonomy in the form of property
rights. In this way, propertied individuals are as dependent upon
the state for the maintenance of their status as the poor persons
who receive state assistance; there is no theoretical difference be-
tween the wealthy man and the poor welfare recipient. If the back-
ground rules of economic entitlement can be readily altered by the
state, and it is clear that they can, then the lives of property owners
are as contingent as the lives of the propertyless. This contingency
repeatedly surfaces in changing legal rules that alter the balance of
rights and duties. For example, in some states, over time, the con-
tent of the rights and obligations of landlords has been trans-
formed;2 93 the rights of tenants have increased at the expense of
291. Simon, supra note 38, at 1444; Handler, supra note 92, at 901-02.
292. Compare Simon, supra note 38, at 1444, with Handler, supra note92, at 901-02,
954-55 (criticizing Simon's argument).
293. Maine and New York statutes create a duty on the landlord to provide habita-
ble conditions, without creating a duty upon the tenant to keep them habitable. ME.
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landlords. Similarly, until recently, the Supreme Court has allowed
the states to diminish individual property rights by their imposition
of strict land use regulations.294
The control that the state has over the rules of economic entitle-
ment challenges the very foundation of what it means to be depen-
dent. Just as the state could abolish any entitlement that a poor
individual has to access the community coffers for her subsistence
or grant a tax-credit for stay-at-home spouses, so too could the
state alter the meanings of the vast rules of economic entitlement.
This means that propertied individuals derive their rights of subsis-
tence from the state, and they are protected in those rights by the
state. If that is so, then the distinction drawn between our wealthy
individual and our welfare recipient is a false dichotomy. The
wealthy individual's dependence is merely sublimated in the legal,
political, and economic discourse in a way that the welfare recipi-
ent's is not. Of course, this is a theoretical argument that must
confront the facts of life: powerful individuals simply are not
threatened by dependency discourse, rather, they help control it.
Nevertheless, it is important not to lose sight of the ways in which
this sublimation and discourse work in concert.
Just as an independently wealthy person is in some ways depen-
dent, so also may the poor person who relies upon state assistance
be independent in at least some respects. As a condition of their
relationship with the state, welfare recipients certainly must con-
form their behavior to a wide variety of rules. Throughout the his-
tory of American welfare programs, the government routinely has
intruded into the private lives of welfare recipients. Even today, to
obtain assistance, a recipient is subject to restrictions on her family
planning decisions, the people with whom she lives, and the per-
sonal information that she may keep private. She is also required
to participate in work, volunteer, or training programs. In this way,
recipients certainly are dependent in the way that Charles Reich
feared; they are coerced by their need for sustenance into relin-
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6021 (Supp. 1982-83); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-6
(Supp. 1981-82); see Michael J. Davis, Survey of Kansas Law: Real Property, 41 KAN.
L. REV. 669, 669-72 (1993). See generally Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Resi-
dential Landlord-Tenant Law: Causes and Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517
(1984).
294. This trend toward allowing such state interference under the Fifth Amend-
ment began iii Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922), and for many years there-
inafter was left to the discretion of state courts. The Court, however, has recently
increased its oversight of land use regulations. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483
U.S. 825 (1987).
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quishing some measure of their autonomy. Moreover, they are de-
pendent to the extent that the community, through the state,
concludes that they are unable to or not trusted to make decisions
in their own and their family's best interest. It is the conditions
accompanying the receipt of state assistance, rather than the actual
economic support she receives from the state, that makes the indi-
vidual a dependent.
In addition, the economic coercion inherent in a fight for subsis-
tence creates a reality in which, at least for the most destitute,
there is no meaningful free choice in the decision to accept the
conditions of welfare. It is also true that if recipients of state assis-
tance instead worked in the private sector, they might enjoy some
measure of economic stability and freedom and thereby have a
greater measure of autonomy. Still, as I have shown, this is not
necessarily so. But, what if the individual is given assistance with-
out the demands of personal behavioral conformity? Would she
still be a dependent?
Historically, cash instead of vouchers or in-kind charity was
thought to be better for the individual because it gave her the au-
tonomy to purchase what her family really needed. Thus, if she
were able to raise vegetables in a garden, she might not need to
purchase as much food for her family; or if she had a sewing ma-
chine, she might be able to supply her family with clothing at a
smaller expense. This idea stressed that individuals can more effi-
ciently and accurately assess and meet their own needs. Moreover,
these individuals remain in the market for goods.295 In this respect,
the continuing primacy of cash assistance in the welfare program
continues this emphasis and diminishes a claim that the recipients
wholly lack independence.
Giving poor women assistance without concomitant regulation
also allows them other kinds of freedom. The most obvious of
these is the woman's ability to choose whether to stay home and
rear her children or whether to work. 96 State assistance might also
enable a woman to sustain herself and her child while she attends
college or other post-secondary educational institutions. In these
ways, state assistance could operate, at least to some extent, to
295. See BELL, supra note 264, at 163 (discussing how welfare helps to assure recipi-
ents access to the market).
296. Of course, as I have said, in the fight for subsistence, this choice, in fact, may
be an illusion. Because of low benefit levels, many women find alternative sources of
income to supplement their grants, and thus do not operate solely as home workers as
more well-off women do.
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level the comparative opportunities facing poor women and chil-
dren as opposed to women of means. The "luxuries" of being free
to stay home to raise one's children or to develop one's intellect,
skills, and marketability would not be choices limited only to cer-
tain economic classes. But this change in approach would need to
be accompanied by a change in rhetorical stance toward the poor-
away from the various negative connotations of dependency.
Moreover, it can hardly be disputed that the effort that millions
of women expend to 'rear their children is work in a real sense.
This is true whether or not they work for wages outside the home
and whether or not they receive state relief or a tax credit. As I
have already described, however, for complicated social and eco-
nomic reasons, after the onset of industrialization and the rise of
corporatist capitalism, the dominant signifier of independence be-
came white, male wage-work outside the home.297 Despite con-
temporary rhetoric that emphasizes the traditional role of the
family and the value of having a non-working parent present in the
home, this signifier has not undergone dramatic change. Although
the classes of individuals incorporated into this ideal of indepen-
dence has changed, who counts as an independent worker remains
rooted in both the location and type of work that the individual
performs: work in the wage labor market outside the home. 98 Wo-
men's work rearing children is simply not valued the same way.
As this construct of independent work has changed over time, so
too can it change again. Just as social and economic norms consti-
tuted the powerful laws that converted all income earned by mar-
ried women into the property of their husbands, so today do norms
endure in defining the value and status of certain types of work.
Rather than stigmatizing single women as dependent for their reli-
ance on state assistance instead of a wage-earning male, the choice
to rely upon state assistance for the purpose of rearing children
could be treated as a valid decision. But, for these individuals to be
treated with respect as independent and valuable contributors to
the community, both dependence rhetoric and social norms would
have to change. Women's role in rearing healthy and well-adjusted
children would have to be recognized and celebrated as an impor-
tant social and economic addition to the community's health.2 99
297. See supra notes 205-209 and accompanying text.
298. Id.
299. I present this argument more as a theoretical possibility than a real one, to
illustrate the social focus and treatment of poor individuals as dependent.
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Giving people a social wage may also increase their indepen-
dence by allowing workers to cease direct competition with each
other and increase their ability to unify and to mobilize. 30 0 As
Gosta Esping-Andersen describes it,
[T]here are certain, albeit quite few, principles of social policy
common to virtually all kinds of labor movements. One is
clearly decommodification from the whip of the marketplace.
Without this, collective action itself becomes hardly possible.
Workers need a basic command of resources in order to be pre-
vented from acting as strike breakers or from underbidding fel-
low workers, and in order to be effective and reliable
participants in a solidaristic community.30 1
By relying upon state relief, individuals are able to resist the im-
pulse to cross picket lines for longer periods of time, thereby rais-
ing the effectiveness of any unified labor campaign. Polanyi, for
example, hypothesizes why England's early Speenhamland Law
may have had the contrary effect of increasing pauperism rather
than decreasing it as intended: anti-combination laws prevented in-
dividuals from acting upon any motivation that might have been
present to organize to improve working conditions and wages for
entire classes of people.30 2
[T]he weakness of absolutism and the dominance of a laissez-
faire-inspired bourgeoisie in the Anglo-Saxon nations goes a
long way in accounting for the 'liberal' regime .... [S]ocial
policy was never neutral, but part of a more general campaign to
weaken, or absorb, the socialist impulse and to secure a lasting
institutionalization of politically preferable principles of social
organization. 30 3
The discourse I have been describing, with its unstated and stated
normative preferences that define dependence and independence,
is part of the same campaign. Interestingly, in the United States,
only after the most recent welfare reform effort in which millions
of recipients were required to work in municipal service jobs did
alliances between labor and welfare rights activists emerge.30 4 Un-
300. ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 283, at 12. "By eradicating poverty, unemploy-
ment, and complete wage dependency, the welfare state increases political capacities
and diminishes the social divisions that are barriers to political unity among workers."
Id.
301. Id. at 109.
302. See POLANYI, supra note 55, at 81.
303. ESPING-ANDERSEN, supra note 283, at 110.
304. Steven Greenhouse, Petitions Seek Vote on Union for Workfare, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1997, at B1. Municipal unions are hostile to workfare for they "rightly under-
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til the scope of welfare work requirements threatened the condi-
tions under which laborers worked, continued stigmatization of
welfare recipients and divisive rhetorical terminology that distin-
guished laborers and their interests from welfare recipients limited
the possibility of forming alliances between and among these
groups.
CONCLUSION
In raising the foregoing descriptions, criticisms, and questions, I
have made claims about both the content and the validity of the
rhetoric of dependency as it is used by politicians, policy-makers,
and social philosophers of all stripes. I questioned the coherence
of using the categories of "dependent" and "independent," of con-
structing dependency as a social problem, and of using it as a justi-
fication for regulating certain classes of individuals while ignoring
similar concerns in others. These categories are simply so ambigu-
ous as to be worthless except as a way to mark in the popular con-
sciousness the inferiority of certain classes. How could it be
otherwise in a discourse where the word "independent" at once
means both individualism and conformity?
Similarly, there is no doubt that conceptions about which indi-
viduals and classes of people are "dependent" have changed over
time. These changes are the result of and contribute to altering
social, economic, political, and theoretical norms and conditions.
The dramatic historical change in popular and legal conceptions of
dependent classes illustrates that the content of terms like "depen-
dent" are fluid and have a particular social purpose. The continu-
ing categorization of individuals and groups as dependent
constructs and maintains certain kinds of social organization and
relationships of subjugation. It creates a status and consciousness
of inferiority in the social domain as much as it enhances the stand-
ing and prestige of the independent class. It reifies an "us and
them" distinction from both perspectives. Moreover, the rhetorical
uses of dependency that I have described operate as a proxy for
unstated biases. Whether these biases are about differences be-
tween economic or social class, morality, culture, race, gender, or
the structure of government and our responsibilities to each other,
the terms dependent and independent are not without normative
stand that welfare recipients armed with brooms are a threat to their members' jobs."
Jason DeParle, supra note 222, at 50.
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power. Depending on who uses the terms and how, the biases
therein may be different.
As commentators and theorists continue to use these terms dis-
cursively, they block the development of alternative models of re-
lation. In the discourse, the dialectic of dependent and
independent forms a one-way relation. The dependent offers noth-
ing, contributes nothing, indeed, cannot "exist or sustain [itself], or
perform anything without the will power or aid of someone
else[,] '' 30 5 the independent. The independent individual, or the
community she represents, is the ideal, separate, aloof, in control,
and has the answers. The idea that individuals might be interde-
pendent, mutually responsible, or that the same individual might
be independent in some ways and dependent in others has no place
in the dialectic. The rhetoric poses few commonalities among the
opposing individuals. Instead it privileges property, conformity,
autonomy, and concern only for the self and one's immediate fam-
ily. It prevents the development of a theory of responsibility or
concern for anyone else.
305. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 7.
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